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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the self-settled special needs pooled 
trust, a relatively new option available to elder law attorneys, estate 
and trust lawyers, and other legal practitioners serving disabled or 
injured elderly clients.  It also examines the legal ethics involved in 
various initial client-lawyer engagements where the trust specialist is 
being engaged to design, implement, and fund such a trust, raising 
questions of lawyer loyalty and conflict of interests, confidentiality, 
and privity running to the trustee, the beneficiary or both. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SELF-SETTLED SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST 
A.  The Discretionary Support Trust 
The self-settled special needs trust emanated from the 
discretionary support trust, a vehicle that has been well-defined for 
generations.1  The discretionary support trust is created to provide 
the trustee unqualified power to pay the beneficiary a certain 
 
 1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 (1959) (defining a 
discretionary trust). 
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amount of the income and capital of the trust, or to pay nothing at 
all.2  The beneficiary has no way to access or control the trust 
interest whose character, even more than the express declarations 
of the settlor, may prevent alienation or attachment.3  Historically, 
the nature of the discretionary support trust gives the beneficiary 
no assignable interest before the trustee distributes any portion of 
the income or principal to the beneficiary.4  Once there is 
distribution, however, the distributed income or property is 
exposed to claims of creditors of the beneficiary.5  Generally, to 
overcome the reach of attachment or creditor claims, spendthrift 
clauses are made a part of the trust.6  Spendthrift clauses are a 
standard of practice among elder law, estate planning and trust and 
estate lawyers.7 
When the beneficiary creates the discretionary trust, it is 
defined as a self-settled discretionary trust.8  Such a trust vehicle has 
rarely been a safe harbor for asset protection against creditors.9  
Less protected has been the self-settled trust that a person creates 
when attempting to insulate resources from state agencies 
operating means tested benefit programs prior to the person 
qualifying for those programs.10 
B.  The Special Needs Trust 
Historically the special needs trust (“SNT”) evovled from the 
 
 2. See GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 113 (4th ed. 1963). 
 3. Id. at 114 (citing Calloway v. Smith, 186 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Ky. 1945)). 
 4. See A.W. SCOTT & W.F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 155 (4th ed. 1987) 
(citing McNiff v. Olmsead County Welfare Dept., 287 Minn. 40, 44 , 176 N.W.2d 
888, 892 (1970)). 
 5. This was the general policy across the country prior to 1997.  In 1997, the 
statutory Self-Settled Discretionary Spendthrift (“SSDS”) trust was enacted in 
Alaska, and followed in 2000 by Nevada and Rhode Island with their own statutory 
SSDS trusts.  See David G. Shaftel, Newest Developments in Alaska Law Encourage Use of 
Alaska Trusts, ESTATE PLANNING Feb. 1999 (citing Jonathan G. Blattmachr & 
Howard Zaritsky, North to Alaska–Estate Planning Under the New Alaska Trust Act, 32 
U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. (1998)); Jeffery N. Pennell, 1997 Current 
Estate Planning Developments, THE S. CAL. TAX & EST. PLAN. FORUM (1997)). 
 6. See BOGERT, supra note 2, at 114. 
 7. See ROBERT WHITMAN & DAVID M. ENGLISH, FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING AND 
TRUST ADMINISTRATION GUIDE § 17.3 at 175 (ALI-ABA 2002). 
 8. See CLIFTON B. KRUSE, JR., THIRD PARTY AND SELF-CREATED TRUSTS 3 (ABA 
1998). 
 9. See id. (citing Vanderbilt Credit Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 473 
N.Y.S.2d 22, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)). 
 10. Id. 
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irrevocable discretionary trust.11  With more than twenty years of 
SNT development, consumer driven organizations, including the 
ARC of America, and affiliated organizations in every state, the 
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill and the National Autistic 
Society, and its affiliates across the states, just to mention a few, 
have been advising their members, numbering in the millions, to 
utilize the SNT for estate planning purposes.12 
C.  What the SNT Does 
The SNT vehicle takes unilateral, discretionary powers given to 
trustees for various situations and broadens the scope by specifically 
expanding how the trustee supplements the needs of the trust 
beneficiary.  There are several variations of SNT distribution.13  In 
one, the SNT details how the trustee, within his/her/its sole 
discretion, administers the trust for the sole benefit of the 
beneficiary, providing:  health and medical provisions; social and 
educational programs and services; recreation, vacations and even 
trips abroad where appropriate; and institutional or group home 
transition and placement, promoting community-based, least-
restrictive alternatives that would enhance the quality of life of the 
trust beneficiary.14 
Additionally, the SNT is developed as irrevocable and 
spendthrift in nature.15  The settlor develops language that bars any 
use of trust funds for services already provided to the beneficiary 
through federal and state programs.  The SNT is exempt under 
federal and state agency regulations that consider such trusts 
appropriate as a matter of public policy.16 
 
 11. Id. at 4. 
 12. See Harriet P. Prensky & Patricia Tobin, Using the Special Needs Trust, 4TH 
ANNUAL NAELA SYMPOSIUM ON ELDER LAW § 15 (1992); M. Kent Olsen, Pooled 
Income Trusts Following OBRA ‘93, NAELA ADVANCED INSTITUTE ON ELDER LAW IV § 
17 (1994). 
 13. See generally Cynthia L. Barrett, Distribution Standard for the Special and 
Supplemental Needs Trust, 14 J. OF NAT’L ACAD. OF ELDER L. ATT’YS (hereinafter 
“NAELA QUARTERLY”) 10, 10-13 (Summer 2001) (describing the six most 
commonly used trust distribution standards and the likely impact on needs-based 
public programs). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See State Medicaid Manual, Part 3–Eligibility, HCFA Transmittal No. 64 
(1994). 
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D.  Special Needs Pooled Trust History 
In 1950, parents of mentally retarded children organized the 
National Association of Parents and Friends of Mentally Retarded 
Children.17  As the children became adults and their parents aged, 
the name changed (National Association of Retarded Citizens, aka 
ARC of the United States) and the focus turned to finding those 
who would care for the aging people with mental retardation after 
their parents died or were no longer able to care for them in the 
community.18 
In the 1970s, parents of children with severe chronic 
disabilities, primarily mental retardation, worked with trust and 
estates counsel to develop vehicles that would not only provide for 
the transfer of funds for the benefit of their children with severe 
disabilities, but, more importantly, mandate to the trustees detailed 
instructions that addressed the quality of care and the quality of life 
of the children to be served by the trustees.19 
State-based non-profit associations, organized as affiliates of 
ARC, created parallel umbrella or pooled trusts that would receive 
the assets of the parents in separate sub-accounts, and in return use 
the corpus of the sub-trusts for the care-giving and quality of life 
needs of the parents’ mentally retarded children.  This is where the 
concept and model for the d4C special needs pooled trust 
(“SNPT”) came from when the legislation for prohibitions and 
restrictions on trusts as part of Medicaid eligibility was hammered 
out in congressional committee.20 
E.  SNPT Politics 
In the early nineties, Congress, concerned about escalating 
Medicaid costs, made a concerted effort to stiffen regulations by 
 
 17. See WOODHULL HAY, Associations for Parents of Mental Retardates in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA (1952), available at 
 http://www.thearc.org/history/hay.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2002). 
 18. Robert Segal, The National Association for Retarded Citizens, at 
http://www.thearc.org/history/segal.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2002). 
 19. See OLSEN, supra note 12, at 3-4.  See also Renee Lovelace, The Dark Side of 
Pooled Trusts, 14 J. OF NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’YS 6,  7 (2001); ARC, Aging Position 
Statement #23, at http://www.thearc.org/posits/agingpost.html (last visited Aug. 
23, 2002). 
 20. See A. Frank Johns, Interface with Elder Law: Elder Law’s Broader 
Application of Estate Planning Reaches Beyond the Legal Profession--Is It Beyond 
Lawyering as Well?, 23rd Annual Duke Estate Planning Conference (2001). 
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which persons would become Medicaid-eligible.21  As various 
congressional committees wrote legislation focused on so-called 
“Medicaid planning loop-holes,” the Medicaid Qualifying Trust 
became a primary target for repeal.22  However, the consumer 
groups identified above teamed with the AARP and other 
organizations in the aging network, including the National 
Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, to negotiate the exemption of 
several trusts that, if designed to allow for a “pay-over”23 (paying to 
the nonprofit) or “pay-back”24 (reimbursement of the state for 
Medicaid expenditures on behalf of the trust beneficiary) at the 
end of the trust beneficiary’s life, would be exempt and not 
counted under Medicaid eligibility requirements.25 
Lobbyists for the ARC and other organizations articulated that 
tens of thousands of citizens already had such trusts in place 
through hundreds of affiliated non-profit associations around the 
country.26 
F.  The Expanded Prohibitions Against Self-Settled Discretionary 
Support or Special Needs Trusts 
In 1985, Congress declared a statutory prohibition that targets 
inter vivos self-settled trusts, including those for spouses, barring 
access or attachment by state agencies providing public resources 
to those trust creators and beneficiaries applying for Medicaid.27  
During this same period, the basic discretionary support trust was 
expanded into supplemental or special needs trusts for disabled 
persons, usually serving children of the grantors with mental 
retardation or mental illness.28  As these trusts became more widely 
recognized and used, critics decried the misuse of Medicaid, a 
public benefits program for the poor, by children of the elderly 
 
 21. See generally Ira S. Wiesner, Asset Transfers, Trust Availabiity and Estate 
Recovery Under OBRA ‘93:  Statutory Analysis in Context, 3d NAELA Advanced Elder 
Law Institute §§ 2-3 (1993); M. Kent Olsen, Trusts, Medicaid and OBRA ‘93, NAELA 
Advanced Elder Law Institute III §§ 2-3 (1993). 
 22. See KRUSE, supra note 8, at 4, 11. 
 23. See Lovelace, supra note 19, at 6 n.2. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See infra note 33. 
 26. See supra note 21. 
 27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) (2002). 
 28. See H. RUTHERFORD TURNBULL, III, ET AL., DISABILITY AND THE FAMILY Chs. 
14–16 (Brookes ed., 1989). 
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middle class, attempting to salvage their inheritances.29 
G.  OBRA ‘93 - Great Restrictions and Narrow Exceptions on SNTs 
The prohibition against self-settled trusts created to gain 
eligibility for Medicaid benefits was expanded in the early nineties 
with passage by Congress of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 
1993 (also known as the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993 or OBRA ’93).30  The specific language declares: 
 (d) Treatment of trust amounts 
(1) For purposes of determining an individual’s 
eligibility for, or amount of, benefits under a State plan 
under this subchapter, subject to paragraph (4), the 
rules specified in paragraph (3) shall apply to a trust 
established by such individual. 
(2)(A) For purposes of this subsection, an individual 
shall be considered to have established a trust if assets of 
the individual were used to form all or part of the 
corpus of the trust and if any of the following 
individuals established such trust other than by will: 
(i) The individual. 
(ii) The individual’s spouse. 
(iii) A person, including a court or 
administrative body, with legal authority to act in 
place of or on behalf of the individual or the 
individual’s spouse. 
(iv) A person, including any court or 
administrative body, acting at the direction or 
upon the request of the individual or the 
individual’s spouse. 
 (B) In the case of a trust the corpus of which 
includes assets of an individual (as determined under 
 
 29. The antagonists painted broad strokes and pithy sound bites, decrying so-
called Medicaid Planners.  See, e.g., Jane Bryant Quinn, “Poor” Middle Class Eats Up 
Medicaid Program, THE GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Sept. 15, 1996 (“[Medicaid 
planning] pops up when elderly people think about nursing homes.  They may be 
able to pay the bill, at least for the first year or two.  But they’d prefer to leave the 
money to their kids (or their kids would prefer it; they sometimes initiate this 
game).”). 
 30. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1993, H.R. 2264, 103d Cong. §§ 
13611, 13612 (1993) (amending § 1917(c)(1) of the Social Security Act) 
(enacted). 
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subparagraph (A)) and assets of any other person or 
persons, the provisions of this subsection shall apply to 
the portion of the trust attributable to the assets of the 
individual. 
(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection 
shall apply without regard to — 
(i) the purposes for which a trust is 
established, 
(ii) whether the trustees have or exercise 
any discretion under the trust, 
(iii) any restrictions on when or whether 
distributions may be made from the trust, or 
(iv) any restrictions on the use of 
distributions from the trust. 
(3)(A) In the case of a revocable trust - - 
(i) the corpus of the trust shall be 
considered resources available to the individual, 
(ii) payments from the trust to or for the 
benefit of the individual shall be considered 
income of the individual, and 
(iii) any other payments from the trust shall 
be considered assets disposed of by the 
individual for purposes of subsection (c) of this 
section. 
  (B) In the case of an irrevocable trust — 
(i) if there are any circumstances under 
which payment from the trust could be made to 
or for the benefit of the individual, the portion 
of the corpus from which, or the income on the 
corpus from which, payment to the individual 
could be made shall be considered resources 
available to the individual, and payments from 
that portion of the corpus or income — 
(I) to or for the benefit of the 
individual, shall be considered income of the 
individual, and 
(II) for any other purpose, shall be 
considered a transfer of assets by the 
individual subject to subsection (c) of this 
section; and 
8
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(ii) any portion of the trust from which, or 
any income on the corpus from which, no 
payment could under any circumstances be 
made to the individual shall be considered, as of 
the date of establishment of the trust (or, if 
later, the date on which payment to the 
individual was foreclosed) to be assets disposed 
by the individual for purposes of subsection (c) 
of this section, and the value of the trust shall be 
determined for purposes of such subsection by 
including the amount of any payments made 
from such portion of the trust after such date.31 
With the sweeping prohibition came a narrowly structured set 
of three irrevocable “pay-back” or “pay-over” trusts against which 
the prohibition would not apply.32  “Pay-back” or “pay-over” 
requirements would either repay Medicaid all payments made 
under the Medicaid Program to the beneficiary of the trust at the 
end of the beneficiary’s life, or pay over to the NPA the corpus of 
the trust remaining at the end of the beneficiary’s life.  The trusts 
are statutorily described as follows: 
  (4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the 
following trusts: 
(A)A trust containing the assets of an individual 
under age 65 who is disabled (as defined in section 
1382c(a)(3) of this title) and which is established for 
the benefit of such individual by a parent, grandparent, 
legal guardian of the individual, or a court if the State 
will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon 
the death of such individual up to an amount equal to 
the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the 
individual under a State plan under this subchapter. 
(B) A trust established in a State for the benefit of 
an individual if — 
(i) the trust is composed only of pension, 
Social Security, and other income to the individual 
(and accumulated income in the trust), 
(ii) the State will receive all amounts 
remaining in the trust upon the death of such 
individual up to an amount equal to the total 
 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d) (2002). 
 32. Repayment would be all amounts remaining in the trust up to the total 
amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary.  See infra note 34. 
9
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medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual 
under a State plan under this subchapter, and 
(iii) the State makes medical assistance 
available to individuals described in section 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(v) of this title, but does not 
make such assistance available to individuals for 
nursing facility services under section 
1396(a)(10)(C) of this title. 
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual 
who is disabled (as defined in section 1382(c)(a)(3) of 
this title) that meets the following conditions: 
(i) The trust is established and managed by a 
nonprofit association. 
(ii) A separate account is maintained for each 
beneficiary of the trust, but, for purposes of 
investment and management of funds, the trust 
pools these accounts. 
(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely 
for the benefit of individuals who are disabled (as 
defined in section 1614(a)(3)) by the parent, 
grandparent, or legal guardian of such individuals, 
by such individuals, or by a court. 
(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in 
the beneficiary’s account upon the death of the 
beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust 
pays to the State from such remaining amounts in 
the account an amount equal to the total amount 
of medical assistance paid on behalf of the 
beneficiary under the State plan under this title. 
(5) The State agency shall establish procedures (in 
accordance with standards specified by the Secretary) 
under which the agency waives the application of this 
subsection with respect to an individual if the individual 
establishes that such application would work an undue 
hardship on the individual as determined on the basis of 
criteria established by the Secretary. 
(6) The term “trust” includes any legal instrument or 
device that is similar to a trust but includes an annuity 
only to such extent and in such manner as the Secretary 
specified.33 
 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(d)(4)(A)(B) and (C) (2002) [hereinafter d4A, 
10
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III. OPERATION OF THE D4C SPECIAL NEEDS POOLED TRUST 
The statutory criteria for the SNPT focuses on:  (A) eligibility 
of beneficiaries (especially those older than sixty-five); (B) a non-
profit association [“hereinafter NPA”] establishing and managing 
the trust; (C) a separate or segregated account for each beneficiary; 
(D) a pooled umbrella trust for investment and management of the 
funds of all SNPTs held by the NPA; (E) accounts in the pooled 
umbrella trust are maintained for the sole benefit of the persons 
who are disabled; (F) creation of the trusts are by parents, 
grandparents or legal guardians of such persons, by such persons 
or by a court; and (G) remaining corpus of individual SNPTs left in 
the trust is retained by the NPA, repaying to the Medicaid program 
all other corpus not left in the trust up to the amount of medical 
assistance paid by Medicaid for the beneficiary of the SNPT.34 
A.  No Age Restriction Expressly Declared in a d4C SNPT 
Since passage of OBRA ‘93, disabled, injured or elderly 
persons younger than sixty-five have had the benefit of special 
needs trusts under one particular section of the law.35  Those over 
sixty-five were without such a benefit for many years.36  The Social 
Security Administration took the position that: “such transfers are 
subject to transfer penalties.  Nothing in the Medicaid statute 
permits us to reach a different conclusion.  We believe that this 
policy is clearly set forth in sections 3258.10 and 3259.7 of the State 
Medicaid Manual.”37 
A review of HCFA 64 sections 3258.10 and 3259.7 shows the 
circuitous argument HCFA used to reach its “belief.”38  Nowhere in 
the “Medicaid” statute did Congress expressly declare that the d4C 
trust was restricted to use by those under sixty-five.39  Congress was 
explicit in its language, only restricting the d4A trust to use by 
 
d4B and d4C], and implementing instructions, State Medicaid Manual, Part 3- 
Eligibility, HCFA Transmittal No. 64 (1994) [hereinafter HCFA 64]. 
 34. See d4C. 
 35. See d4A. 
 36. See KRUSE, supra note 8, at app. D, 241-42, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-24-023 (March 
22, 1995) (regarding transfers into pooled trusts for beneficiaries over age sixty-
five). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See supra note 33. 
11
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individuals under the age of sixty-five.40  However, HCFA wrote a 
broader restriction in section 3258.10B, grafting the under-sixty-five 
restriction on all OBRA ’93 exempt trusts, including the d4C 
SNPT.41 
In the fall of 2001, HCFA responded to an inquiry by author 
Clifton Kruse, Jr., declaring that people sixty-five or older have not 
been limited from use of the d4C SNPT.42  The actual language of 
the letter states: 
With regard to your question about why certain trusts for 
the disabled are subject to an age limit, the conference 
report accompanying the enabling legislation (OBRA 92) 
provided very little insight into why Congress elected to 
write the legislation (including those portions that apply 
an age limit to the trusts in question) as it did.  In the 
absence of any explanation from the Congress itself as to 
why it imposed an age limit on those trusts, we hesitate to 
speculate on Congress’ motivations in imposing such a 
limit.  As a technical point, however, we would note that 
while an age limit does apply to two of the trusts you cite, 
the statute does not impose an age limit on the trust cited 
at 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4)(C).43 
With such an option available, lawyers serving older Americans 
need to be aware of governmental benefit constraints, identifying 
who their client is throughout the process; maintaining careful 
attention to how the SNPT is developed, implemented and funded 
through an appropriately qualified, organized and operated NPA; 
and maintaining assurances that the elder persons for whom the 
trusts are created actually receive benefits that enhance the quality 
of their lives and extend their assets in ways that supplement their 
standard of care for longer periods than had they not had the trusts 
available.44 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. See State Medicaid Manual, Part 3–Eligibility, HCFA Transmittal No. 64, 
supra note 16, § 3258.10, Exceptions to Applications of Transfers of Assets Penalties, B. 
“The assets were: . . .[t]ransferred to a trust (including a trust discussed in § 
3259.7) established for the sole benefit of an individual under 65 years of age who 
is disabled as defined under SSI.”  Id. 
 42. A copy of the Letter Ruling is on file with the author.  See also KRUSE, supra 
note 8, at 328. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See John W. Staunton & Leo J. Govoni, Special Needs Trusts: Planning 
Vehicles that Have Come of Age, 3 ELDER’S ADVISOR, THE J. OF ELDER L. AND POST-
RETIREMENT PLAN. 28, 30 (spring 2002). 
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An NPA qualifies as trustee to administer a d4C special needs 
pooled trust if it meets all necessary state corporate statutory and 
Internal Revenue Code requirements.45 
B.  NPA Establishing and Managing d4C SNPTs 
1.  Typical Statutory Requirements for NPAs 
There are no extraordinary elements necessary to create and 
operate the NPA that qualifies to manage d4C SNPTs.  There must 
be compliance with the charitable corporations or non-profit 
associations statutes in the state where the NPA is a resident.  In 
many states, there need be only one incorporator, officer, and 
board member.  At times, the lawyer serves in all positions just to 
create sufficient inertia to bring those operating and supporting 
the NPA into a forum that will serve the lawyer’s clients and others 
as well.  There is usually no stock issued, and often there are no 
members of an NPA created to manage d4C SNPTs. 
Examples of NPAs providing care-giving and trust services for 
SNPTs stretch across the country.  One such NPA is Life Plan Trust 
of North Carolina, an NPA started in 1990 by The Arc of North 
Carolina and NAMI North Carolina (formerly the North Carolina 
Alliance for the Mentally Ill).  As explained on its website, Life Plan 
Trust works with families of individuals with developmental 
disabilities, mental illness and other disabilities to help develop 
comprehensive plans for future care, serving as trustee for funds 
designated for the benefit of disabled family members.  Two other 
sponsoring organizations of the NPA include the Autism Society of 
North Carolina and United Cerebral Palsy.46 
Similar to other NPAs, Life Plan Trust of North Carolina has 
an $800 enrollment fee and a $175 annual update fee with an 
assurance that once a family enrolls the fees will not increase.47  
The fees are not to be confused with delivery of case management 
services, currently billed at $60 per service hour.  The enrollment 
fee and annual update fees may be paid in monthly installments 
over a period of months or years.48  The NPA makes it clear that 
fees for client services are not tax deductible, but the contributions 
 
 45. See supra note 33. 
 46. See http://www.arcnc.org/lpt/faq.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2002). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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solicited by the organizations are tax deductible because the NPA 
has tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC).49 
Another example of an NPA serving d4C SNPTs is the self-
incorporation of Tennessee Pooled Assets, Inc. by Timothy L. 
Takacs, in the summer of 2000.50  Takacs, a well-recognized 
member of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys 
(“NAELA”), made his work product available to other NAELA 
members, hoping to assist advocates in other states to take the 
initiative to organize pooled trusts, making SNPTs more readily 
available to people with disabilities and older Americans.51 
Once the incorporation is filed and the charter is issued by the 
secretary of state, the NPA often partners with a banking 
institution, a trust company or a securities entity with a trust 
component to bring asset investment and management 
sophistication into the process, meeting the financial and fiduciary 
responsibilities associated with d4C SNPTs. 
The NPA created to be trustee of exempt d4C SNPTs must 
have sufficient charitable purposes.52  Usually, the focus is on 
foundation status with additional components that allow for tax-
exempt charitable gifts.53 
2.  Internal Revenue Code Requirements for Tax-Exempt Status–
IRC § 501(c)(3) 
A tax-exempt NPA under section 501(c)(3) of the IRC must be 
organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the 
purposes set out in the IRC, and none of the organization’s 
earnings may be distributed to private shareholders.  Also, the tax-
exempt NPA is barred from political action because a substantial 
part of its activities attempts to influence legislation, and it is 
completely barred from participating in any political campaigns or 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. The work product of Takacs, comprising nonprofit charter, nonprofit 
organizing by incorporator, nonprofit bylaws and nonprofit organizing by the 
board, are on file with the author. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Lovelace, supra note 19, at 6.  Lovelace actually describes the start-up 
of the pooled trust as one primarily founded by those with compassion and 
commitment to promote respectful quality of care and independent living options 
for persons with disabilities of all ages.  Id. 
 53. Id. at 7. 
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activities for or against political candidates.54 
The organizations described in section 501(c)(3) are 
commonly referred to as “charitable organizations.”55  The exempt 
purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3) are charitable, religious, 
educational, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, fostering 
national or international amateur sports competition, and the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals.  The term charitable is 
used in its generally accepted legal sense and includes relief of the 
poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged; advancement of 
religion; advancement of education or science; erection or 
maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening 
the burdens of government; lessening of neighborhood tensions; 
elimination of prejudice and discrimination; defense of human and 
civil rights secured by law; and combating community deterioration 
and juvenile delinquency.56 
Organization of an SNPT as tax-exempt must be exclusively for 
a charitable purpose.  An individual or partnership will not qualify; 
only a corporate entity whose charter must limit its purposes to one 
or more activities that are not in furtherance of one or more of 
those purposes defined in the IRC will qualify.  This requirement is 
met by reference to declared purposes in section 501(c)(3) in the 
corporation’s charter. 
Additionally, the exempt entity must permanently dedicate its 
assets to an exempt purpose, including that its assets will be 
distributed for a section 501(c)(3) exempt purpose or to a federal, 
state or local government for a public purpose.  Assurance of 
compliance may be shown by a provision in the corporate charter 
insuring assets will be distributed for an exempt purpose in the 
event of dissolution.57 
An organization will be regarded as “operated exclusively” for 
one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in 
activities which accomplish one or more of the exempt purposes 
 
 54. See generally IRS Publ’n 557, Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization 
(Rev. July 2001). 
 55. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(i) (as amended in 1990). 
 56. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1990). 
 57. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) and (5) (as amended in 1990).  See 
also, IRS Publ’n 557 (Rev. July 2001) (“Although reliance may be placed upon 
state law to establish permanent dedication of assets for exempt purposes, an 
organization’s application can be processed by the IRS more rapidly if its articles 
of organization include a provision insuring permanent dedication of assets for 
exempt purposes.”). 
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specified in section 501(c)(3).  An organization will not be so 
regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is in 
furtherance of non-exempt purposes.58  The organization must not 
be organized or operated for any private purpose, and no net 
earnings shall be of benefit or interest to private entities or 
individuals.  If such a private benefit transaction passes to a person 
having substantial influence over the organization, then a possible 
excise tax may be imposed on the person and any managers 
agreeing to the transaction.59 
3.  Internal Revenue Code Requirements for Section 509 
Often the NPAs are organized under the tax-exempt 
foundation requirements of section 509 of the IRC.  Generally, 
‘‘private foundation’’ means a domestic or foreign organization 
described in section 501(c)(3), with other exceptions.60  NPAs 
functioning on a foundation basis must not receive more than one-
third support in each taxable year from any combination of gifts, 
grants, contributions, or membership fees.61  Gross receipts of the 
NPA may also come from admissions, sales of merchandise, 
performance of services, or furnishing of facilities, in an activity 
which is not an unrelated trade or business, in any taxable year to 
the extent such receipts exceed the greater of $5,000 or one 
percent of the organization’s support in such taxable year, from 
persons other than disqualified persons with respect to the 
organization, from governmental units as described, or from 
organizations as described.62  The NPA must continue singular 
operation of those functions that first gained tax-exempt status.63 
While the NPA must be non-profit, OBRA ‘93 does not require 
such a narrow focus as to be created only by those entities that have 
members who will benefit from the SNPTs that would be 
administered by the NPA.64  Lovelace writes that organizations 
creating the NPAs have voluntary boards and voluntary attorneys 
that use fundraising skills on the built in market of their own 
members. She explains that this is often necessary because SNPT 
 
 58. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iii) (as amended in 1990). 
 59. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1990). 
 60. See I.R.C. § 509 (2002). 
 61. I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A)(i) (2002). 
 62. I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2002). 
 63. I.R.C. §§ 509(b),  507 (2002). 
 64. See supra note 34, and accompanying text. 
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administration is difficult and costs are high.65 
C.  Separate or Segregated Account for Each Beneficiary 
For the trust to be exempt, the corpus of each individual’s 
trust account must be separate and segregated, categorically 
benefiting only the persons with disability, including those sixty-five 
and older who are medically needy.66  Banks or trust companies 
providing services for the trust funds under management have the 
necessary programs to maintain each account.  The bank or trust 
company will also make necessary distributions, and apply interest 
accumulation with monthly or quarterly statements.67 
D.  A Pooled Umbrella Trust for Investment and Management of the 
Funds of All SNPTs Held by the NPA 
As detailed above, pooled trusts are special needs trusts 
comprised of assets of elder citizens and people with disabilities 
and consolidated under an umbrella trust of an NPA, serving as 
trustee and responsible for the care of the trust beneficiaries.68  It 
has been noted that the term “pooled income trust” has been used 
occasionally in describing the d4C SNPT.69  Olsen mentions that it 
would be beneficial to use a trust form, meeting the requirements 
of the pooled income fund described in IRC § 642(c)(5), similar to 
the sample published by the IRS in 1988 to deal with pooled 
income trusts because there have been many requests for rulings 
dealing with the qualification of such trusts.70 
Since pooled trusts are exempt under Medicaid, each 
beneficiary of the pooled trust is usually an eligible Medicaid 
recipient, if all other eligibility criteria are met.71  The assets of the 
special needs trusts are pooled under an umbrella trust for 
management and cost efficiency, with accumulating interest 
credited to each individual’s sub-account.72  The supplemental or 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Lovelace, supra note 19, at 8.  See also Barrett, supra note 13. 
 68. See supra note 33. 
 69. See Olsen, supra note 12, at 3-4. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Not only is it a matter of cost efficiency, it is probably the only way that 
commercial banking or trust entities may be enticed to provide the investment 
and asset management services that many NPAs are incapable of providing. A 
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special needs of each individual are funded with the assets ascribed 
categorically to the individual during the individual’s lifetime, or 
until the individual’s funds are exhausted.  If no court process is 
involved, then a joinder agreement establishes the sub-trust that 
frames the individual’s care plan, providing the NPA the basis by 
which distributions through a structured annuity might be 
determined, or monthly care-giving expenses might be developed.73 
An NPA providing care and advocacy for the beneficiaries of 
the trusts must be the trustee of the pooled trusts in order for the 
trusts to be exempt as d4C SNPTs.  An incentive to NPAs comes 
when, rather than repaying Medicaid for all of the expenses that 
the client accumulated in long-term care, the NPAs retain the 
assets remaining in the trust in order to serve other Medicaid 
recipients of similar need.74 
The importance of the concept deserves restatement.  If 
Medicaid recipients have no one to care for them, and no families 
available to advocate their interests, then the NPA, as trustee of the 
pooled trust for the benefit of the Medicaid recipients, would 
supplement the Medicaid needs of the beneficiaries of the pooled 
trust in order to sustain the quality of their lives.  Any assets 
remaining in the pooled trust beyond the lives of the beneficiaries 
would be retained by the NPA to be used for its purposes and 
mission in serving similarly situated vulnerable elder citizens or 
persons with disabilities.75 
E.  Accounts in the Pooled Umbrella Trust are Maintained for the Sole 
Benefit of the Persons Who Are Disabled 
Every sub-trust of the NPA, carried under the umbrella trust 
must individually declare that its corpus is for the sole benefit of 
the primary beneficiary of the sub-trust.76  As important as the 
declaration of sole benefit is in the sub-trust document, the 
administration and distribution requirements imposed on the NPA 
must at all times evidence the use of the principal and interest 
accumulation of the sub-trust for the sole benefit of the primary 
 
majority of the SNPTs created have modest amounts of principal incapable of 
meeting the minimum amount necessary to be accepted by commercial banks and 
trust companies. 
 73. See Olsen, supra note 12, at 6. 
 74. Id.  See supra note 33. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  See supra note 33. 
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beneficiary. 77 
The impact of whether or not the sole benefit of the primary 
beneficiary extends beyond the language of the trust documents 
may be realized during the on-going administration of the trust, at 
the time that the trust terminates, or both.78  If during a periodic 
review of trust receipts and disbursements, the reviewing agency 
finds that those other than the primary beneficiary benefited from 
distribution out of the trust, then the primary beneficiary may be 
declared ineligible with a sanction of some period of time.  
Additionally, when the trust terminates at the end of the 
beneficiary’s life, or when the corpus of the trust is depleted, the 
state agency may declare that since the trust had operated in 
violation of the sole benefit rule, the “pay-back” provision would be 
invoked, denying the “pay-over” to the NPA as a penalty against it.79 
F.  Creation of SNPTs by Parents, Grandparents or Legal Guardians 
of Such Persons, by Such Persons or by a Court 
The d4C SNPT is the only OBRA ‘93 exempt trust that may be 
self-settled or self-created.  The individual, if competent, may create 
the trust him- or herself.  However, a majority of the SNPT 
beneficiaries probably does not have sufficient capacity to create 
the trust.  If a beneficiary is not competent, but her or his money is 
to be used to fund the SNPT, then the requisite durable power of 
attorney or guardianship must be in place to effectuate the SNPT’s 
creation. 
If the SNPT is created from funds derived from personal injury 
litigation, then there may be several complicated layers of 
procedural process added that may need more than just elder law 
or estate and trust expertise.  To quickly end personal injury 
litigation, the funds may be offered in a lump sum, circumventing 
the time needed to develop a structured settlement.  When this 
occurs, the lawyer involved must be experienced and capable of 
placing the funds in a Qualified Settlement Fund (“QSF”) as a safe 
haven until the structure is set and the annuity purchased.80  
 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Mary T. Schmitt Smith, After the Wedding–Administration of Special Needs 
Trusts: Tuning Up the Trustees, NAELA Advanced Elder Law Institute VII, § 19 
(1997); Roger M. Bernstein, Special Needs Trusts: Administration and Compliance, 14 
J. OF NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’YS 13 (Summer 2001). 
 79. See Lovelace, supra note 19, at 6. 
 80. See IRC § 130(c).  A qualified assignment may be made of any liability to 
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Having the funds initially placed in the QSF meets certain 
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.81 
When the elder law or estate and trust attorney is sought to 
develop an SNPT as a receptacle for the settlement or judgment of 
personal injury litigation, the first ethical question is no different 
than the ethical question raised at the beginning of any client-
lawyer relationship--who is the client?  The answer and its ethical 
discussion are found later in the article.82 
G.  Remaining Corpus of Individual SNPTs Left in the Trust is 
Retained by the Non-profit Association, Repaying to the Medicaid 
Program All Other Corpus Not Left in the Trust Up to the Amount 
of Medical Assistance Paid by Medicaid for the Beneficiary of the 
SNPT 
The underlying reason for the way this part of the law is 
written is grounded in the public policy focus of the d4C SNPT 
exemption.  One political agenda item in Congress at the time 
OBRA ‘93 was enacted83 was the down-sizing of “big government” 
thereby reducing taxes and the so-called “Welfare State.”84  
Changing the pay-back to Medicaid so that it became a pay-over to 
an NPA in essence created a revenue source for private NPAs to 
provide additional care-giving and advocacy for those otherwise 
dependant on federal and state funds and local government case 
management.85 
 
make periodic payments as damages awarded pursuant to a judgment or 
settlement, or as compensation under any workmen’s compensation act, on 
account of a physical personal injury or sickness.  In order to be a “qualified 
assignment,” however, an assignment must meet requirements as detailed in the 
section. Id.; see also Rev. Proc. 93-34, 299, announcing that a “designated 
settlement fund” or a “qualified settlement fund” would be treated as a “party to 
the suit or agreement” within the meaning of IRC § 130(c)(1), and after August 
10, 1993, an assignment made by a designated or qualified settlement fund is a 
qualified assignment if the certain requirements are met.  Id. 
 81. Effective for claims filed after August 5, 1997, liability to make periodic 
payments as compensation under any workmen’s compensation act, or other 
personal injury claim may also be validly assigned.  IRC § 130(c). 
 82. See infra section IV. 
 83. See supra note 33. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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IV. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS ARTICLE 
A.  The General Framework of Legal Ethics 
Generally, lawyers are mindful of the rules of professional 
conduct as they relate to client engagement.86  Within the elder law 
and estate-planning context, lawyers need to be aware of the 
prospective client and the newly enacted ABA model rule that 
addresses the prospective client.87  Beyond the concern for conflict 
of interest and confidentiality as relates to a prospective client, 
attention should also be given to the diminished capacity of the 
prospective client.88  This has greater importance in the context of 
this article because trust beneficiaries must be disabled to be 
eligible for Medicaid.89  Significant numbers of those who are 
disabled SNPT beneficiaries are mentally incompetent as well.90 
Other recent changes to the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct are worth noting, as this article examines more 
complicated ethical considerations that elder law and estate and 
trust lawyers would confront in considering the benefit of the 
SNPTs as an option for clients. 
B.  Recent Changes to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
that Impact Lawyers Developing Special Needs Pooled Trusts when 
Serving Injured, Disabled and Elderly Clients 
Over the last several years, the ABA and state bars have 
confronted the changing status of the legal profession by generally 
responding to ethical and practice changes, many of which will 
specifically impact elder law and estate and trust attorneys.  
Through the Center for Professional Responsibility, the ABA 
developed and interpreted standards and scholarly resources in 
 
 86. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are used throughout this 
article for the ethics analysis.  Adoption of the Model Rules in virtually every state, 
whether in whole or in part is the broadest disciplinary mandate that is uniform 
across the country.  See Jeffery N. Pennell, Ethics, Professionalism and Malpractice 
Issues in Estate Planning and Administration, 2 (ALI-ABA 2002). 
 87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2002). 
 88. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.14 and accompanying 
comments.  See also the revisions to MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7 and 
accompanying comments 29-32. 
 89. See Social Security Act § 1614(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3).  See also supra 
note 33. 
 90. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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legal ethics, professional regulation, professionalism and client 
protection mechanisms.91  Since 1997, the ABA went further, 
organizing two commissions, one to look internally at the 
profession’s ethics beyond the year 2000,92 and the other to look 
externally at how law practices will be organized into the next 
century.93 
The ABA Ethics 2000 (E2K) Commission worked at a feverish 
pace from its beginning in August 1997, to February of this year, 
finishing its task for presentation of its recommendations at the 
annual meeting of the ABA House of Delegates in August of 2001, 
and at its midwinter meeting in February 2002.  The thirteen-
member Commission, reflecting the ABA’s diversity with judges, 
law professors, government lawyers, corporate counsel, civil and 
 
 91. With substantial overlap and interaction, the Center describes its 
departments as follows:  the Ethics Department is the place for study, development 
and implementation of model legal and judicial ethics standards; the 
Professionalism Department provides counsel to various ABA committees as well 
as support in efforts to improve the professionalism and competence of lawyers 
and judges; the Professional Regulation Department provides legal support and 
policy guidance for various ABA committees as well as responds to requests for 
information on case law, statistics and procedural standards; and The Client 
Protection Department serves the concerns and best interests of the client 
population through programs that prevent or redress harm done in the practice 
of law or the rendering of legal services. See 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/home.html. 
 92. In support of its assertion that it has maintained a great leadership role in 
ethics and professionalism of the legal profession, the ABA cites the adoption of its 
ethical standards by virtually every jurisdiction, implicitly acknowledging that it is a 
recognized leader and the appropriate forum for discussing, drafting and 
adopting rules governing lawyer conduct. See 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html. 
 93. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (hereinafter ABA 
MDP Commission) was created in August, 1998, to face the unprecedented 
challenges of revolutionary advances in technology and information sharing, of 
the globalization of the capital and financial services markets, and of more 
expansive government regulation of commercial and private activities.  The ABA 
MDP Commission’s members included a cross-section of the legal profession 
including distinguished practitioners, judges, and academicians.  It worked 
believing that there was a degree of urgency with the emergence of consulting 
firms that had been aggressively soliciting clients, offering services remarkably 
similar to those traditionally offered by law firms, such as advice on mergers and 
acquisitions, estate planning, human resources, and litigation support systems.  In 
1999, the recommendations for MDP were tabled.  In 2000, the New York Session 
of the ABA House of Delegates overwhelmingly defeated the recommendations 
for MDP.  The ABA Journal reported that on July 11, 2000, the delegates “crushed 
mixed practices in which lawyers and other professionals would work under the 
same roof, sharing fees and firm ownership.”  See John Gibeaut, “It’s a Done Deal,” 
House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chances for MDP, 86 A.B.A. J. 92 (September 2000). 
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criminal practitioners and one non-lawyer, was charged with:  1) 
conducting a comprehensive study and evaluation of the ethical 
and professionalism precepts of the legal profession; 2) examining 
and evaluating the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
the rules governing professional conduct in the state and federal 
jurisdictions; 3) conducting original research, surveys and hearings; 
and 4) formulating recommendations for action.94 
The ABA E2K Commission met and fulfilled its charge when 
during the 2001 meeting of the American Bar Association House of 
Delegates in Chicago; the House voted on the recommended 
additions and revisions of the Model Rules from the Preamble 
through Rule 1.10 and approved the Commission’s 
recommendations with several exceptions.95 
The passage of a new definition of informed consent in Model 
Rule 1.0(e), revisions of confidentiality in Model Rule 1.6, and 
conflict of interest in Model Rule 1.7, brings clarity to elder law 
attorneys and estate and trust lawyers.96  The new definition of 
informed consent in new Model Rule 1.1 will assist elder law 
attorneys and estate and trust lawyers to conclude whether or not 
elderly clients of diminished capacity still have sufficient informed 
consent to engage an attorney for representation and the delivery 
of legal services.97 
The clarity of the amended definition of conflict of interest in 
Model Rule 1.7, removes the confusion between direct adversity 
conflicts and material limitation, assisting elder law attorneys and 
estate and trust lawyers in determining which situations pose “a 
significant risk” such that the representation will be limited by the 
lawyer’s interests and duty to others.98  This will be applied in this 
article when the lawyer is determining if there is a significant risk 
that compromises loyalty and duty when representing the NPA of 
an SNPT and the primary beneficiary as well. 
 
 94. See http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html. 
 95. Rule 1.5: approved an amendment to delete the requirement of a writing 
in Rule 1.5(b).  Rule 1.6: approved an amendment to delete proposed Rule 
1.6(b)(2). In light of the House’s action in deleting 1.6(b)(2), the Commission 
withdrew its proposed 1.6(b)(3).  The House also approved an amendment from 
the Commission to modify Rule 1.6, Comment [13].  Rule 1.10: approved an 
amendment to delete proposed Rule 1.10(c).  See 
 http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html. 
 96. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2002), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_home.html. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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Initially, the ethical analysis in this context is not difficult.  The 
elder law attorney or estate and trust lawyer knows to pose the 
question, “Who is the client?” to those who have made the initial 
appointment.99  The answer should always come from them.  The 
client is often the elderly person seeking legal engagement for 
developing ways by which asset preservation and quality of life 
issues might be addressed for future needs.  However, this initial 
contact becomes more complicated when there are members of the 
family other than the spouse in the conference, when multiple 
individuals are identified for involvement beyond the initial 
consult, or when the older person who is seeking legal services has 
diminished capacity.100  While inter-generational or family unit 
representation is not within the scope of this article,101 what is 
within its scope is multiple and secondary or derivative client 
representation, touching on the Doctrine of Privity as well.102  The 
article’s focus within that scope is the stress that presses against the 
ethical boundaries of lawyering as the lawyer begins the client-
lawyer relationship, developing the SNPT for the injured or 
 
 99. See generally Bruce A. Green & Nancy Coleman, Ethical Issues in Representing 
Older Clients, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 961 (1994) (discussing potential conflicts of 
interest in the representation of joint clients, such as husbands and wives).  See infra 
note 117. 
 100. See Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to 
representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1073, 1080 
(1994); Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices–What’s an 
Attorney to Do? Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 
1153 (1994); Robert B. Fleming & Rebecca C. Morgan, Lawyers’ Ethical Dilemmas:  
A “Normal” Relationship When Representing Demented Clients and Their Families, 35 
GEORGIA L. REV. 735 (2001). 
 101. See Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Approaches to Conflicts in 
Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1258 n.17, citing Patricia M. Batt, 
Note, The Family Unit As Client: A Means to Address the Ethical Dilemmas Confronting 
Elder Law Attorneys, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 319 (1992); see also Thomas L. Shaffer, 
The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963 (1987). 
 102. See Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Ethical Obligations of Counsel In Representing Clients 
Petitioning to be Appointed as Guardians of Others or of Their Estates, or Both, 8 J. OF 
NAT’L ACAD.  ELDER L. ATT’YS 13 (1995).  See also Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 
P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (Fickett, considered seminal, is cited in most writings 
and decisions in this area of law); In re Guardianship of Styer, 536 P.2d 717 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1975)  The facts of the guardian’s misconduct on which the Fickett 
decision was predicated are found in this trial case where a judgment surcharge 
was affirmed against the guardian for $378,789.62.  Id.  For an analysis, see A. Frank 
Johns, Fickett’s Thicket: The Lawyer’s Expanding Fiduciary and Ethical Boundaries When 
Serving Older Americans of Moderate Wealth (hereinafter Fickett’s Thicket), 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 445 (1997); Pennell, supra note 86, at 56; Bruce S. Ross, 
Conservatorship Litigation and Lawyer Liability: A Guide Through the Maze, 31 STETSON 
L. REV. 757, 776-80 (2002). 
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disabled elderly client, involving the NPA trustee and counseling 
the NPA on administration of the trust and distribution of the 
income and principal of the trust, this being the more active 
component much later in the lawyer’s engagement.103 
For elder law, estate planning, family law, tax, and general 
practice attorneys, representation in the twenty-first century will go 
beyond identification of the single client, often including joint and 
multiple representation, involving intergenerational and 
multigenerational family layers.104  Before representation may be 
established, there must be confirmation that the prospective client 
has sufficient competence or capacity to enter into the client-lawyer 
engagement.105  Once the identification of the client is confirmed, 
the broader spectrum of elder law engagement may address quality 
of life and quality of services to the elders in the family.106  
Concomitant with medical and health care needs, the engagement 
may also delve into consideration of long term care insurance, 
estate and divestment planning for tax or governmental benefits 
consideration, asset exemptions and transfers and in-home options 
often leading to transition into assisted living or nursing home 
environments, or even transition of residency, domicile and state 
citizenship.107 
 
 103. Notice how in this one sentence the lawyer begins by representing the 
beneficiary and ends by representing the NPA. 
 104. See generally A. Frank Johns, Multiple and Intergenerational Relationships, in 
THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 7 (2001 Symposium Issue, American Bar Association). 
 105. See Fleming & Morgan, supra note 100, at 750-51. 
 106. See William E. Adams & Rebecca C. Morgan, Representing the Client Who Is 
Older in the Law Office and in the Courtroom, 2 ELDER L. J. 1, 2 (1994).  The National 
Elder Law Foundation (NELF), the only national American Bar Association-
licensed entity certifying attorneys in elder law, identifies fourteen areas in which 
examination is required for lawyers to gain NELF board certification in elder law: 
(1) HEALTH AND PERSONAL CARE PLANNING; (2) PRE-MORTEM LEGAL 
PLANNING, including TRUSTS; (3) POST-MORTEM LEGAL PLANNING, Probate 
and Estate Administration; (4) FIDUCIARY REPRESENTATION; (5) LEGAL 
CAPACITY COUNSELING, GUARDIANSHIP and CONSERVATORSHIP; (6) 
PUBLIC BENEFITS ADVICE–from Medicare to Medicaid to Special Assistance; (7) 
INSURANCE MATTERS–from health, to GAP, to life, to long term care; (8) 
RESIDENT RIGHTS ADVOCACY; (9) HOUSING COUNSELING; (10) 
EMPLOYMENT AND RETIREMENT COUNSELING; (11) INCOME, ESTATE, 
AND GIFT TAX COUNSELING; (12) TORT CLAIMS AGAINST NURSING 
HOMES; (13) LITIGATION IN JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
JURISDICTIONS; and (14) AGE OR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING. 
 107. Id. 
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C.  Proceeding in the Client-Lawyer Engagement within the Context of 
Developing the SNPT 
This section briefly frames the general application of legal 
ethics at the inception of any client-lawyer engagement, then moves 
through several categories of individuals and entities with whom 
elder law attorneys and estate and trust lawyers might negotiate the 
SNPT client-lawyer engagement. 
1.  General Application of the Ethics Rules at the Inception of Any 
Engagement 
At the inception of being engaged, all attorneys generally must 
deal with client competence, communication, confidences and 
loyalty.  Elder law attorneys also must assess the client’s competence 
to hire counsel or to have sufficient informed consent to enter into 
a contractual relationship that delivers future legal services.  Many 
elder law attorneys have included as an element of the scope of 
prospective representation a reasonable screen, assessment or 
calculation of client capacity within the consult.108  Acting with 
sensitivity, reasonable legal competence and diligence, elder law 
attorneys assess client capacity while honoring client confidences 
and protecting property.109 
a.  Initial Client Contact 
Whether denominated lawyer-client, or client-lawyer,110 the 
legal profession has proceeded at a snail’s pace when it comes to 
including client capacity in discussions about the initial client 
conference.111  Professor Rebecca Morgan, an elder law authority, 
wrote about the representation of older clients, “[a]lthough the 
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility  . . . recognize the non-
litigation roles of attorneys more explicitly  . . . the Model Rules still 
fail to provide adequate practical guidance to the elder law 
 
 108. See Fleming and Morgan, supra note 100, at 750-51. 
 109. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 19. 
 110. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 
§ 2.1 (explaining that the four duties [competence, communication, 
confidentiality and loyalty] of the core principles of the law of lawyering run to the 
client, and noting that The Kutak Commission symbolized the primacy of client 
interests by reversing the common “lawyer-client” reference).  See also ACTEC 
Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (3d. ed. ACTEC 
Foundation 1999) [hereinafter ACTEC Commentaries] . 
 111. See generally Johns, supra note 104. 
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practitioner.”112  Little is found outside the elder law construct to 
guide lawyers through the rigors of confirming sufficient client 
competence or capacity at initial contact, allowing consultation, or 
determining what, if any, future legal services may be contracted.  
The recent revisions to the Model Rules introduced new Model 
Rule 1.18 relating to the prospective client, which, beginning with a 
concise definition, addresses confidentiality and examines possible 
material adverse interests between the prospective client and the 
lawyer.113  Currently there is no connection between Rule 1.18, 
defining the prospective client, and Model Rule 1.14, client with 
diminished capacity, which addresses the ongoing client-lawyer 
relationship when the client has declining mental abilities.114  
There needs to be a connection between the two rules, providing 
 
 112. See Adams & Morgan, supra note 106, at 13 (citing, among others, Ronald 
C. Link, et al., Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate 
Planning Lawyer: The Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1987)). 
 113. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L  CONDUCT, R. 1.18 (2002) 
DUTIES TO PROSPECTIVE CLIENT 
(a) A person who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a 
client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective 
client. 
(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has 
had discussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal 
information learned in the consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would 
permit with respect to information of a former client. 
(c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with 
interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same 
or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information 
from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that 
person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer 
is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in 
a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or 
continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in 
paragraph (d). 
(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined 
in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if: 
(1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given 
informed consent in writing, or 
(2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable 
measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than 
was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the 
prospective client; and 
(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any 
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the 
fee therefrom; and 
(ii) written notice is propmptly given to the prospective client. 
 114. See generally Johns, supra note 104. 
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guidance to lawyers dealing with prospective clients with 
diminished capacity.115 
b.  Formation of Client-Lawyer Relationship 
The legal profession first views the relationship of the client 
and lawyer based on the manifestation of the person’s intent.  The 
relationship arises when a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s 
intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person.116  While 
intent is founded on capacity, general legal texts address the client-
lawyer relationship based on the client having fully informed 
consent,117 which is based on what the lawyer discloses to the client 
concerning the benefits and advantages of the proposed 
representation and conflicts of interest.  There is general legal 
comment about legally incompetent clients who require 
representation for which they are personally incapable of giving 
consent.118  However, the writings identify those who are already 
incompetent and are either represented by a guardian or, if 
minors, represented by their parents.119 
c. Current and Future Consideration of the Prospective Client 
Currently, few general writings of the legal profession mention 
the attorney’s need to assess the elderly client’s competence to hire 
counsel or to assess capacity to function and make legal choices 
with informed consent.120  Since the new Model Rule 1.18 
regarding the prospective client only looks at confidentiality and 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 14 (2000) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT 3D-LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS]. 
 117. See Model Rule 1.0(e). New definition of informed consent applicable to 
all Model Rules of Professional Conduct: 
(e) “Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a 
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated 
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and 
reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See RESTATEMENT 3D-LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 116 (referencing 
case law addressing legally incompetent clients based on minority). 
 120. Cf. Erica Wood & Audrey Straight, Effective Counseling of Older Adults (ABA 
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly of the ABA and Legal Counsel for 
the Elderly, Inc., 1995).  Age myths that stereotype older people as senile, 
confused, disabled, and the like, promote the dangers of “ageism.”  While some 
degree of short-term memory loss is part of normal aging, a significant or 
complete failing in mental abilities is not a normal part of the aging process. 
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conflicts in terms of the lawyer’s duty to the prospective client, 
there remains a lack of guidance regarding the prospective client’s 
diminished capacity.121  Consider Model Rules 1.2 and 1.16, 
bracketing the beginning and the ending of the client-lawyer 
relationship.  These rules are more concerned with the lawyer’s 
role and whether what the lawyer is being asked to do is moral or 
ethical, than whether the client has capacity to consummate the 
engagement. 
d.  The Lawyer’s Duties to Prospective Clients 
Even if not engaged, the lawyer may have duties to prospective 
clients that include protecting confidential information, property 
and providing reasonable care.  This is where emphasis on the 
client’s capacity deserves attention.  Attention to client capacity is 
not currently examined in the legal profession until the client-
attorney relationship has been established and is ongoing.122  Texts 
referenced above provide information and basic primers on 
structuring initial contact, intake and the first consultation in an 
elder law practice.  The client-lawyer relationship begins with the 
initial call, proceeds to the initial appointment and continues 
through the first conference. 
2.  The Lawyer, the SNPT and the Initial Client Engagement 
The need for an SNPT surfaces in various ways in the practice 
of elder law and estate and trust lawyers.  A disabled or elderly 
person may need specialized legal assistance to negotiate and 
develop the SNPT with a NPA or consumer group; plaintiff or 
defense counsel may seek specialized legal assistance to fund a trust 
with the settlement or judgment derived from personal injury 
litigation for a permanently disabled plaintiff; banking or trust 
counsel may refer their client for specialized legal assistance in the 
development of a supplemental or special needs trust for the 
client’s banking customer; an NPA or consumer disability advocacy 
group may seek specialized legal assistance for a disabled member 
or to assist in the creation of the umbrella trust or separate sub-
 
 121. See supra note 110, and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra note 88, Model Rule 1.14; see also, RESTATEMENT 3D-LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 117, § 24 A Client With Diminished Capacity, at 2-
69 through 2-75, § 31 Termination of A Lawyer’s Authority, 2-103-2-110; see ACTEC 
Commentaries, supra note 110, at 131. 
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trusts; a guardian or attorney in fact may seek specialized legal 
assistance to negotiate and develop the SNPT with a NPA or 
consumer group. 
a.  Ethics Analysis 
As stated earlier in this article, the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the ABA (“Model Rules”) are often used for ethics 
assessments.123  Beyond the core requirements of loyalty and 
diligence, Pennell suggests the ethical issues confronting elder law 
and estate and trust lawyers fall under several general categories.124  
In this article, several of the above described areas of client-lawyer 
engagement are analyzed,  focusing on conflicts of interest, failure 
to exercise independent judgment and violation of client 
confidences. 
(1) The Disabled Person as Client 
The d4C SNPT requires the individual beneficiary of the trust 
to be disabled.125  However, the individual may be mentally 
competent, while at the same time meeting the statutory definition 
of disabled.126  This is where a tension between the plaintiff and the 
family may surface, leading to possible material conflicts with the 
plaintiff’s attorney and the SNT specialist (“Specialist”)  involved. 
(a) The Mentally Competent Disabled Client 
When the disabled client is competent, the attorney should 
make it a habit of practice to meet separately and privately with the 
disabled beneficiary to directly and frankly discuss the limitations 
on the use of judgment or settlement funds, and the distributions 
that will be available from the SNPT.127  It is critical that the lawyer 
provide the client an explanation of the lack of wealth transfer at 
 
 123. See Pennell, Ethics, Professionalism and Malpractice Issues in Estate Planning 
and Administration, supra note 86, at 2. 
 124. Id. at 4.  Conflicts of interest, failure to exercise independent judgment, 
violation of client confidences, incompetent or inadequate representation, 
excessive fees, special estate administration concerns, a general sense of duty to 
the system and misconduct involving solicitation and advertising.  Id. 
 125. See supra note 33. 
 126. See generally revised MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.14, supra note 
88 and accompanying text (changing the emphasis from focusing on a client 
under disability to a client with diminished capacity). 
 127. See supra note 66, and accompanying text. 
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the end of the beneficiary’s life under the SNPT, as well as the 
involvement of the NPA in carrying the authority and control over 
the client’s case management and distributions from the SNPT.128 
Many family members of the SNPT beneficiary assume that 
they have a right to funds of the personal injury judgment or 
settlement.  Purchases of houses, vehicles and other personal 
property items in the names of family members become points of 
tension and contention between the family members and the 
lawyers even before the SNPT is funded.  Those family members 
involved in hiring the SNT specialist often believe that Specialist is 
acting in their interests, beyond the interest of the SNPT 
beneficiary, supposedly his or her client.  However, if the SNT 
specialist raises an objection, asserting opposition against self-
serving actions of family members, (s)he may find that the family 
members have acquired the assistance of new counsel.  First and 
foremost, the lawyer must counter the tensions and 
misunderstandings of the people involved with the identification of 
the client.  When the identity of the client is confirmed at the 
inception of the engagement, then the lawyer’s protection and 
focus on the SNT beneficiary is more easily accepted by the other 
family members, especially when it has been memorialized in an 
engagement contract.129 
Often, spouses and other family members are identified as 
plaintiffs in the litigation.  At the beginning of the client-lawyer 
relationship, the attorney must clarify if they are also clients of the 
SNT specialist in a multiple representation.130  It should be made 
 
 128. Id.  If under the age of sixty-five, the client may choose to have the trust 
created under d4A, without the NPA and its receipt of the remaining assets at the 
end of the beneficiary’s life.  Under d4A, after Medicaid payback, the remaining 
corpus of the trust may be distributed to identified contingent beneficiaries, or 
distributed as dictated by the will of the primary beneficiary, or distributed to the 
deceased beneficiary’s estate. 
 129. A proposed revision of the ABA Model Rules included a recommendation 
that lawyers have written engagement contracts.  However, in the August 2001 
meeting of the House of Delegates, it declined to require lawyers to put all fee 
agreements with their clients in writing.  Under existing rules, only contingent fees 
must be committed to writing.  See Margaret Colgate Love, Summary Of House of 
Delegates Action On Ethics 2000 Commission Report, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-summary_2002.html (last visited August 15, 
2002).  See also Summary of House of Delegates action on Report 401 during ABA Midyear 
Meeting in Philadelphia (February 2002) http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
202report_summ.html. 
 130. See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7, Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Parties in 
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clear that funds received through individual family members’ 
causes of action are the only funds available for the individual use 
of family members and not the funds settling the SNT beneficiary’s 
personal injury litigation.  Otherwise, a core element of the 
eligibility requirements for the SNPT, namely that the SNPT solely 
benefits  the primary beneficiary, is factually conflicted.131 
(b) The Mentally Incompetent Disabled Client 
There are countless facts, situations and relationships that may 
impact differently, often negatively, on the decision to create an 
SNPT.132  That is why the SNT specialist should acquire sufficient 
facts about the case from the very beginning to confirm the 
necessity of the services.133  If a guardian is already in place, then 
the situation may entail discussion with both the guardian’s 
attorney and the ward’s attorney in order to resolve engagement 
for legal services.134  However, the ward’s attorney may insist that 
the plaintiff’s attorney engage the SNT specialist.  This is possible 
and does not conflict with any ethics rules as long as the plaintiff’s 
attorney understands that the fees of the SNT specialist may be his 
or her responsibility, thus requiring that the plaintiff’s attorney pay 
for such services out of the contingency fee percentage of the 
suit.135  Consider the following case study of Harrison: 
 
Non-Litigation Context, at 107-111 (4th ed. 1999). 
 131. See supra note 33. 
 132. Once the engagement and legal relationship have been confirmed, the 
disability trust Specialist should acquire the pleadings of the case, including the 
complaint, answer, dispositive motions, if any, summaries of any discovery, 
especially any documents, answers to interrogatories, and summaries of transcripts 
of deposition of any medical or health care professionals.  This is necessary in 
order for the disability trust Specialist to have a full understanding of the status of 
the case, and how it presents a case involving a qualified disability. 
 133. Just as important, there needs to be documentation of any ancillary 
proceedings, including adjudication of incapacity and the appointment of a 
guardian and all approvals and denials of eligibility of federal and state benefits. 
 134. Often the lawyer for the guardian is the only lawyer involved in the 
guardianship and may represent the interests of both the guardian and the ward.  
Elder law and estate and trust attorneys must be inquisitive about such 
representation, raising questions of the guardian’s attorney’s ability to represent 
the ward as well. 
 135. See A. Frank Johns, The Application of Recommended Changes to ABA Model 
Rule 1.14 When Initiating Guardianship Intervention for Clients, 14 J. OF NAT’L ACAD.  
ELDER L. ATT’YS 16 (2001). 
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(c) Case Study–Harrison and Personal Injury 
Harrison was 67, two years into retirement and heading to 
meet his wife for a long vacation.  He and his wife were 
working class people of modest means.  What little they 
had saved they were about to spend on that one cruise of 
their lifetimes.  However, as life would have it, on the 
same road, a truck driver fell asleep, crossed the center 
line and hit Harrison’s car at 80 miles per hour, 
demolishing it. 
The accident permanently disabled Harrison, even after 
sixteen hours of reconstructive surgery and seventeen 
weeks in intensive care and rehabilitation.  Between 
Medicare and Medicaid, $266,000.00 was paid for the 
hospital, surgeries, medications and rehabilitation.  
Harrison would require intermediate nursing care for 
many years and attendant, in-home care for the rest of his 
life.  He was also cognitively impaired to the extent that 
formal guardianship may be required to represent his 
interests in his personal injury litigation, to assist him in 
his daily life and to manage his affairs. 
Lawyer may be representing Harrison in the personal 
injury litigation as well as representing Harrison’s wife 
through the guardianship process, ending in her 
appointment as guardian for Harrison.  Lawyer does not 
have the legal experience to develop, fund and 
implement a special needs trust.  Lawyer decides that the 
help of SNT Specialist is needed.  He calls SNT Specialist. 
In the case study, no guardian is yet in place, however one is 
anticipated.  When contacted by the Harrison family lawyer, SNT 
Specialist should inquire about whether there will be an 
appointment of a guardian ad litem for Harrison under Civil 
Procedure Rule 17(c)136 if suit is filed.137  The guardian ad litem, or 
 
 136. Under most state rules of civil procedure, and under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 17(c), provision is made for appointment of a next friend or guardian 
ad litem: 
(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons.  Whenever an infant or 
incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian, 
committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may 
sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person.  An 
infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed 
representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem.  The 
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent 
person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such 
other order as it deems proper  for the protection of the infant or 
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the next friend, is often the spouse.  Harrison’s wife could be the 
guardian ad litem, and should also be considered for appointment 
as plenary guardian or guardian of the person by the probate court.  
Depending upon state law, a guardian may be necessary to assert 
claims for Harrison in the personal injury litigation.138 
Payment for SNT Specialist will often come from the proceeds 
of the settlement or award.  It must be made clear to the disability 
trust specialist that if this is so, then fees may not be paid until after 
the legal services have been rendered and proceeds of the award or 
settlement are disbursed by the court. 
(2) Conflict of Interest–Model Rule 1.7–General Rule 
The complications of Conflict of Interest Doctrine were 
recognized by the ABA E2K Commission, believing lawyers needed 
additional guidance.139  The adopted Model Rule 1.7 revisions are 
designed to clarify the basic doctrine and to address a number of 
recurring situations.  The reorganization of Rule 1.7 Comments 
provides an introduction (Comments  1-3), a general road-map to 
conflicts analysis (Comments 4-13), and finally an elaboration on 
different types of conflicts, especially non-litigation and estate and 




FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See, e.g., Culton v. Culton, 386 S.E.2d 592,  592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989). 
 139. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 140. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 27-33 (2002) (showing 
the proposed revisions that were passed are restated here because of their import: 
[27] Conflict For example, conflict questions may also arise in estate 
planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to 
prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, 
and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may 
arise be present,. In estate administration the identity of the client may 
be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, 
the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or 
trust, including its beneficiaries. The In order to comply with conflict 
of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer’s relationship 
to the parties involved. 
[12] [28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the 
circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple 
parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic 
to each other, but common representation is permissible where the 
clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some 
difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish 
or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually 
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advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in 
which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial 
reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an 
interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. 
The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing 
the parties’ mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to 
obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring 
additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other 
relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of 
them. 
Special Considerations in Common Representation 
[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same 
matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation 
fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the 
result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. 
Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all 
of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, 
the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly 
impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common 
representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations 
between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the 
lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented 
clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is 
unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the 
relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the 
possibility that the clients’ interests can be adequately served by 
common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are 
whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a 
continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or 
terminating a relationship between the parties. 
[30] A particularly important factor in determining the 
appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-
lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to 
the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that, as between 
commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it 
must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the 
privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients 
should be so advised. 
[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common 
representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client 
attempts to keep something in confidence between the lawyer and that 
client, which is not to be disclosed to the other client. This is so 
because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each 
client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the 
representation that might affect that client’s interests and the right to 
expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client’s benefit. 
See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common 
representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s 
informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared 
and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that 
some matter material to the representation should be kept from the 
other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to 
proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after 
being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information 
confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that 
failure to disclose one client’s trade secrets to another client will not 
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The confusing aspects of Model Rule 1.7, when and how to 
apply a material limitation when direct adversity is not present, 
were the target of revising Model Rule 1.7 by the ABA E2K 
Commission.141  The Reporter’s Explanation of Changes to Model 
Rule 1.7 describes how it should make it easier for lawyers to apply 
“material limitation,” “consentability” and “informed consent” to 
the assessment of “who the client is” when initiating client-lawyer 
relationships.  It also explains the expansion of the comments to 
Model Rule 1.7 to provide better guidance to lawyers: 
Unlike prior paragraph (b), in which a conflict exists if 
the representation “may be” materially limited by the 
lawyer’s interests or duties to others, revised paragraph 
(a)(2) limits conflicts to situations in which there is “a 
significant risk” that the representation will be so limited.  
This change is not substantive, reflecting instead how 
prior paragraph (b) is presently interpreted by courts and 
ethics committees.142 
Unlike the prior rule, the revised Rule 1.7 contains a single 
standard of consentability and informed consent, applicable both 
to direct adversity and material limitation conflicts.  This standard 
is set forth in a separate paragraph, both to reflect the separate 
steps required in analyzing conflicts (i.e., first identify potentially 
impermissible conflicts, then determine if the representation is 
permissible with the client’s consent) and to highlight the fact that 
not all conflicts are consentable.143 
In the case study, Lawyer faces the common dilemma of 
 
adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the 
clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the 
informed consent of both clients. 
[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, 
the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer’s role is not that of 
partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that 
the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for 
decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any 
limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a 
result of the common representation should be fully explained to the 
clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). 
[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common 
representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and 
the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former 
client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in 
Rule 1.16.). 
 141. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
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conflict of interest as framed in Model Rules 1.7 and 1.18.144  In 
identifying any potentially-impermissible conflict of Lawyer relating 
to Harrison and his wife, Lawyer must determine if the 
representation is permissible with Harrison and his wife’s consent.  
Is there a reasonable belief that Lawyer would be able to represent 
the wife, as guardian, and Harrison as plaintiff, through the wife as 
guardian, while not adversely affecting the relationship that he 
would have with either Harrison or his wife to the extent that a 
conflict exists?  In this analysis, the operative words may be 
“concurrent conflict.”  If Lawyer is first asked to assist Harrison’s 
wife through the guardianship process, and then subsequently 
represents Harrison’s wife as guardian in the judicial process to 
gain approval of the SNPT, the conflict would not be concurrent, 
as SNT Specialist at all times represents Harrison’s wife as 
petitioner and then subsequently as guardian.145  However, the way 
by which elder law and estate and trust lawyers are initially involved 
in personal injury cases such as this one is often not so carefully 
handled.  A probable engagement will be similar to the one 
described in the case study--Lawyer, representing Harrison, 
subsequently finds a need to represent his wife or a family member 
through the guardianship process.  If these are the facts of the 
engagement, then Model Rule 1.7(b) will further require Lawyer or 
SNT Specialist to determine whether to provide competent and 
diligent representation to each client affected by common 
representation.146  This could mean that the SNT Specialist must 
consult with Harrison and his wife as potentially conflicted clients, 
giving them notice of the possible conflict so that they might make 
informed decisions about the engagement.  If they choose to be 
jointly represented their decisions must be in writing.147 
The twist here is that Harrison is identified as one who may 
have such diminished capacity that he cannot make an informed 
decision.148  Therefore, one of SNT Specialist’s clients is one who 
 
 144. See supra note 96.  See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18, supra 
note 113 and accompanying text. 
 145. Id.; see also ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110 at 152, 175. 
 146. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29 (2002); ACTEC 
Commentaries, supra note 110 at 154. 
 147. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2002). See also ACTEC, 
Engagement Letters: A Guide for Practitioners 9, 19 (1999) [hereinafter Engagement 
Letters]. 
 148. Engagement Letters, supra note 147, at 60. 
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may be incapable of giving consent.149  Additionally, if SNT 
Specialist is representing Harrison and his wife, then current 
practice would probably bar the specialist from representing 
Harrison’s wife as petitioner in the guardianship process.150  The 
situation presents itself as “something that’s just not right” where 
the wife of Harrison as guardian waives her lawyer’s conflict of 
interest relating to her and gives written consent, at the same time 
she waives the lawyer’s conflict of interest relating to Harrison and 
gives written consent for him as well.151 
If Lawyer and SNT Specialist agree that Harrison is SNT 
Specialist’s client, then concern for possible conflicts diminish.152  
 
 149. See RESTATEMENT 3D--LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 116 at § 202(1).  
However, as noted in ABA Form Ethics Opinion 96-404, at n. 3, considering  
comment (1) to Rule 1.14 lawyers are reminded that “a client lacking legal 
confidence often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach 
conclusions about matters effecting the client’s own well-being.  Furthermore, to 
an increasing extent, the law recognized intermediate degrees of competence.”  
Id.  Query whether Harrison has sufficient cognitive function would still allow him 
to understand what the disability Specialist is disclosing about conflict and sign a 
written consent that was informed? 
 150. See Johns, supra note 135; ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 96-404 (1996) 
(discussining provisions of Client Under Disability).  A portion of the opinion is 
pertinent to this analysis and directive: 
A lawyer who is petitioning for a guardianship for his incompetent 
client may wish to support the appointment of a particular person or 
entity as guardian. Provided the lawyer has made a reasonable 
assessment of the person or entity’s fitness and qualifications, there is 
no reason why the lawyer should not support, or even recommend, 
such an appointment. Recommending or supporting the appointment 
of a particular guardian is to be distinguished from representing that 
person or entity’s interest, and does not raise issues under Rule 1.7(a) 
or (b), because the lawyer has but one client in the matter, the putative 
ward. 
Once a person has been adjudged incompetent and a guardian has 
been appointed to act on his behalf, the lawyer is free to represent the 
guardian. However, prior to that time, any expectation the lawyer may 
have of future employment by the person he is recommending for 
appointment as guardian must be brought to the attention of the 
appointing court. This is because the lawyer’s duty of candor to the 
tribunal, coupled with his special responsibilities to the disabled client, 
require that he make full disclosure of his potential pecuniary interest 
in having a particular person appointed as guardian. See Rules 3.3 and 
1.7(b). The lawyer should also disclose any knowledge or belief he may 
have concerning the client’s preference for a different guardian. The 
substantive law of the forum may require such disclosure.   
Id. 
 151. RESTATEMENT 3D- THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, at § 202 cmt. c (ii). 
 152. Under the privity doctrine, plaintiff has no contractual relationship with 
SNT Specialist.  See supra note 111 and accompanying text; see also infra note 204 
and accompanying text and analysis. 
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However, potential conflicts remain.153  SNT Specialist must 
consider how Harrison’s wife and how she (as a non-client) would 
feel about issues raised regarding Harrison’s personal injury special 
needs trust.  She might want to direct SNT Specialist into possible 
conflicts with SNT Specialist’s representation of Harrison.  This 
should be an obvious danger signal, enough to put the lawyer on 
notice and act accordingly.154 
(3) Failure to Exercise Independent Judgment 
Consider the continuing case study of Harrison with the 
following variation: 
Before SNT Specialist was brought into the case, the 
insurance claims adjuster told Lawyer that in other cases a 
trust was constructed to keep the injured person on 
Medicaid and still have the remaining settlement money 
available in a reserve fund.  The adjuster had the 
insurance company’s defense attorney contact Lawyer, 
explaining that the settlement could be greatly expanded 
with a Court ordered structured settlement distributing 
the proceeds to an SNPT. The adjustor explained to 
 
 153. While states that have adopted Model Rule 1.14, or something similar, 
provide clear direction to lawyers when finding it necessary to consider filing for 
guardianship for a client, ethics opinions for states without the rule are also 
instructive.  See North Carolina RPC 157 (before North Carolina adopted Model 
Rule 1.14).  A lawyer who represented a person who the lawyer believed to be 
incompetent was permitted to seek to have the person declared incompetent but 
could not disclose any information that the lawyer had obtained in his course of 
representation that would give rise to the attorney’s belief that the client was 
incompetent.  The rationale was that there was no exception to the disclosure of 
confidential information permitted under the rules.  Id. 
 154. See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, supra note 130, at 108, 
(citing In re Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1992)); Russell G. Pearce, Forward to 
Symposium on “Should the Family Be Represented as an Entity?”: Reexamining the Family 
Values of Legal Ethics, 22 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 1, 2 n.5, 6 and 33 (1998) “[I]n the 
context of bar organization deliberations, arguments for a communitarian 
construction of legal ethics codes has been offered. . . . Apparently as a result of 
lobbying by bar groups, the American Law Institute modified the Restatement of 
Law Governing Lawyers to permit lawyers greater flexibility in limiting their 
obligations to individual family members in joint representation . . . .”  Id.; Linda 
S. Whitton, Durable Powers As a Hedge against Guardianship: Should the Attorney-at-law 
Accept Appointment As Attorney-in-fact?, 2 ELDER L.J. 39, 39 (1994). See also Naomi 
Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and Delegation: The Ethics of Marital Representation, 
22 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 97, 106 (1998); Teresa Stanton Collett, Love Among the Ruins: 
The Ethics of Counseling Happily Married Couples, 22 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 97, 106 
(1998); Steven H. Hobbs and Fay Wilson Hobbs, The Ethical Management of Assets for 
Elder Clients: A Context, Role and Law Approach, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1411 (1994).   
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Lawyer that if Lawyer agreed to a structured settlement 
that was the product of the insurance defense company, 
then the insurance defense company would pay a 
percentage of the commission to Lawyer as a finder’s fee. 
The adjustor assured Lawyer that this was done with many 
other lawyers and that documentation of the 
appropriateness and adequacy of the annuity and of the 
strength of the underlying insurance company would be 
disclosed for the Court’s review. 
 
(a) Conflict of Interest–Model Rule 1.8–Current 
Clients:  Specific Rules 
In the case study, Lawyer is knowingly acquiring a pecuniary 
interest adverse to Harrison.155  Plaintiffs’ lawyers in personal injury 
cases may be conflicted by the defense offering to settle with the 
specific requirement that the defense insurance company’s 
products be used for structuring the settlement, otherwise no 
settlement.  At a minimum, under Model Rule 1.8(a), everything 
offered to Lawyer must be fairly and fully disclosed in writing to 
Harrison and his wife, if she is the guardian, and to SNT 
Specialist.156 
Being involved with the acquisition of an insurance product in 
the form of an annuity, and receiving a fee or commission when 
doing so requires Lawyer to exercise greater responsibilities as 
specifically framed in Model Rule 5.7 relating to ancillary related 
services and products.157  If the state in which Lawyer practices has 
Model Rule 5.7, or a similar rule,158 regarding ancillary and related 
services, then the concern will be whether Lawyer is receiving a fee 
for the product that is being sold for the settlement structure when 
nothing in the facts shows compliance with the rule.159 
 
 155. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L  CONDUCT R. 1.8(i) (2002). 
 156. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L  CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2002). 
 157. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L  CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2002).  See Alex Moschella, 
Model Rule 5.7–The Boundaries of the Profession, 14 J. OF NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATTY’S 
3 (2001). 
 158. Id.  Since 1994, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, North Dakota and 
Pennsylvania (with slight modification) have adopted Model Rule 5.7.  Florida is in 
the process of considering Model Rule 5.7. 
 159. See supra note 157.  In a broader sense, the actions of Lawyer meet the 
“presumptive, albeit rebuttable” design of the current rule in that the sale of the 
annuity is considered “law-related” in that it is being provided by Lawyer, and the 
rules of professional conduct apply.  Id. 
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Elder law and estate and trust lawyers are pushed to expand 
the scope of their specialties in law, defining how the specialties are 
properly delivered to clients.160  To cover the broader scope of 
lawyering, many legal specialists have hired non-lawyer 
professionals in their practices, while others have offered law-
related and non-law related services and products to their clients in 
a one-stop-shop modality.161  Many elder law and estate and trust 
lawyers are now providing various forms of insurance products to 
clients as a complement to asset preservation and estate planning 
legal services.162  The recent revision to Model Rule 5.7,163 has made 
it broader, clarifying ability of lawyers to deliver law-related services 
distinct from the lawyer’s provision of legal services in certain 
circumstances.164  The Reporter explains that the revision prevents 
a literal, strict application of paragraph (a)(1) so that there is never 
a time when law-related services would be distinct from the 
provision of legal services if directly provided by a lawyer or law 
firm, rather than by a separate entity.165 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Moschella, supra note 157, at 3. 
 163. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L  CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2002).  The full text of the rule 
is as follows: 
RULE 5.7: RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING LAW-RELATED 
SERVICES 
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with 
respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph 
(b), if the law-related services are provided: 
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the 
lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients; or 
(2) in other circumstances by a separate an entity controlled by the 
lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take 
reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-
related services knows that the services of the separate entity are not 
legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer 
relationship do not exist. 
(b) The term “law-related services” denotes services that might 
reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are 
related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as 
unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer. 
 164. See Ethics 2000–February 2002 Report: Model Rule 5.7, Reporter’s 
Explanation of Changes, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule57rem.html (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2002). 
 165. Id. 
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(b) Ancillary and Related Legal Products and 
Services–Model Rule 5.7 
The Harrison case study calls for a generalized description of 
what ancillary services are and how the rule impacts on such 
services and products. The National Academy of Elder Law 
Attorneys (NAELA), under the leadership of past president 
Rebecca C. Morgan, professor of law at the Stetson University 
College of Law, examined ancillary and related services in a task 
force from which a NAELA White Paper was published in 1999.166  
The foundation of information on which the recommendations are 
based is a cross-section of many state cases, statutes or codes and 
the rules of state bar organizations across the country.167  The 
services, relationships and products that may fit any practice area 
are broadly defined in two groups:  (1) law related; and (2) non-law 
related.168 
When is it appropriate to provide law-related ancillary services 
and products?  The answer to this question is found in the 1994 
findings of the ABA Committee on Ancillary Business Services, 
appointed to review ancillary business activities by lawyers in 
 
 166. See Alex L. Moschella, Chair, Interim Report on Multidisciplinary Practice and 
Ancillary Services, 11 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’S SYMPOSIUM, at Tab 6, Exhibit 3 
(May 2000) (Plenary session addressing the question of multi-disciplinary practice: 
point-counterpoint). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.  Examples of law-related services, include, but certainly are not limited 
to, the following:  (1) providing internet technology and access to law firms for 
legal research; (2) offering processes and forms for lawyers to integrate into their 
practices that help clients through federal and state fair hearings; (3) promoting a 
lawyer’s trustee and guardianship expertise to be used by other firms for 
appointment to such positions; and (4) offering financial and tax analysis to 
lawyers for their clients. Id. 
Examples of non law related services and products include, but certainly are not 
limited to:  (1) selling all forms of insurance products, especially long term care 
insurance; (2) offering many forms of psychological assessments, geriatric nursing 
and care management services; (3) delivering a wide array of finance, investment 
and money management products and services; (4) publishing advisory bulletins 
and reporter services that keep lawyers and consumers informed about trends in 
elder law; and (5) mechanical and technical support and consultation to elder law 
attorneys who develop, design, and market to consumers, especially on the 
Internet with links, lists, home pages and web visibility.  Id.  All of the above 
references may actually fit in the broader scope of services and products 
considered law-related under the ABA’s Model Rule 5.7.  The Comment to Rule 
5.7 includes title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real 
estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, 
psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical, or environmental 
counseling.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. 9 (2002). 
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preparation for the ABA House of Delegates’ consideration of the 
proposed Model Rule 5.7.169  The answer may also be found in each 
state’s legal ethics rules, decisions, statutes and case law. NAELA’s 
Task Force found that many of the ABA Committee on Ancillary 
Business Services’ findings and recommendations were pertinent to 
any analysis of ancillary and related products and services.170  Two 
are applicable here: 
1.  Whenever a lawyer provides law-related services, “there 
exists the potential for ethical problems,” and that 
“[p]rincipal among these is the possibility that the 
person for whom the law-related services are 
performed fails to understand that the services may not 
carry with them the protections normally afforded as 
part of the client-lawyer relationship.” 
2.  When law-related services are provided by a lawyer 
“under circumstances that are not distinct from the 
lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients,” the 
lawyer in providing the law-related services must 
adhere to the requirements of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct as provided in Rule 5.7 (a) (1). . .”171 
At the time of the findings, the ABA Committee on Ancillary 
Business Services found no reported disciplinary infractions or 
malpractice claims resulting from the delivery of law-related 
services by lawyers through separate entities.172 
(c) Applying the Case Study to Model Rule 5.7 
Consider the continuing case study of Harrison with the 
following variation: 
SNT Specialist found it beneficial years ago to obtain an 
insurance license, authorizing her to sell structured 
annuities while working as an elder law attorney.  She has 
continually maintained her insurance license, selling 
insurance and annuities as a complement to her SNT 
practice. 
As with other cases, SNT Specialist went in with the 
insurance defense company’s lawyer to purchase the 
defense insurance company’s structured annuity for 
 
 169. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2002). 
 170. See Moschella, supra note 157, at 32-33. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 31-34. 
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Harrison.  SNT Specialist would receive a significant 
commission if she sold Harrison and his wife the annuity. 
SNT Specialist went to great lengths to disclose orally and 
in writing what she was doing for Harrison and his wife, 
explaining that she was properly licensed and that the 
license was active and current. 
SNT Specialist also explained orally and in writing that 
she would receive a commission or fee on the sale of the 
structured annuity policy that would fund Harrison’s 
SNPT.  She also provided Harrison and his wife with 
information regarding her license and a toll-free 
telephone number they could call to inquire of the state’s 
Department of Insurance consumer protection 
ombudsman regarding the propriety of the arrangement. 
SNT Specialist went further, offering them information 
from the state’s legal ethics commission that confirmed 
that such an arrangement was within the ethical 
boundaries of the legal profession and in compliance with 
the state’s ethics rule 5.7. 
Assuming the SNT specialist was within the ethical rules of the 
state bar where she practices,173 she has met the primary 
requirements to sell the product to Harrison and his wife by being 
licensed, providing disclosure, and carefully explaining to the 
clients where they may seek more information about the propriety 
 
 173. In states where there is no equivalent to Rule 5.7, state bar organizations 
are carefully examining the future.  The North Carolina State Bar has not 
amended its rules to include Model Rule 5.7, Ancillary and Related Services and 
Products.  However, the North Carolina Multidisciplinary Practice (“MDP”) Task 
Force noted in its report and recommendations (September 2000) that RPC 238 
already permits certain ancillary services by attorneys.  The MDP Task Force 
believes the core values of the legal profession may be maintained when law firms 
offer such ancillary services.  The MDP Task Force further suggested disclosure to 
the public of such arrangements and that such disclosure should be embodied in a 
new Rule of Professional Conduct, such as proposed Rule 5.7.  See also North 
Carolina 2000 Formal Ethics Opinion 9, available at http://www.ncbar.com/eth-op 
(last visited Aug. 14, 2002) (addressing whether an attorney who was also a CPA 
could offer accounting services from within the law firm.  By answering the 
question affirmatively, the North Carolina State Bar led some lawyers to assume 
that attorney/CPAs with proper securities and insurance licenses may provide 
clients with financial planning services and products and receive a fee or 
commission for selling such services or products since many accounting firms offer 
securities as part of their services.  That jump seems to have been premature).  See 
also North Carolina 2001 Formal Ethics Opinion 9, available at 
http://ncbar.com/eth-op (last visited Aug 14, 2002) (concluding that Rule 1.8(b) 
prevents an attorney from taking advantage of financial information received from 
a client during the legal relationship). 
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of her selling ancillary products for a commission.  It is important 
to note that SNT Specialist’s law firm conforms its delivery of 
ancillary services and products to meet the requirements of Model 
Rule 5.7, and those identified in Model 3 of the first ABA MDP 
Commission,174 by assuring that all clients of the ancillary insurance 
service are given clear notice that the services are law related and 
provided in conjunction with the delivery of legal services, and if 
otherwise provided would not be unauthorized practice of law. 
Regardless of the conclusion that the practice of the SNT 
Specialist conforms to Rule 5.7, the lawyer and the insurance 
defense company agent may be acting outside the mandate of 
other ethics rules.175 
SNT Specialist, by taking a commission from the insurance 
defense company annutiy, engages in an impropriety rising to a 
level that is improper based on the facts as presented in the 
variation.  It is not apparent that SNT Specialist made clear to 
Harrison and his wife that she is literally in with the opposition, 
possibly clouding her independent judgment.176  Regardless of the 
current ethics rule in SNT Specialist’s state, state variations and 
iterations within the ABA clearly show that there is significant 
conflict over what rule should apply.  If SNT Specialist intends to 
continue providing such a related service, then she must remain 
cautious and vigilant in tracking future rule developments and how 
changes may impact her ancillary work.177 
(4) Violation of Client Confidences 
Consider the continuing case study of Harrison with the 
following variation: 
While devastated by the accident and severely disabled, 
Harrison lost no cognitive function. In the year that 
followed, it was never certain that Harrison would live. 
The strain on his wife and children was enormous, literally 
driving all of them away, burned out by the stress and 
continual demands Harrison made on all of them. 
 
 174. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 175. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2002) (explaining whether a 
fee is fair and appropriate), R. 1.8 (2002) (explaining disclosure requirements), R. 
5.4 (explaining the professional independence of a lawyer). 
 176. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 28 n.38 (citing Illinois State Bar Ass’n 
Advisory Op. No. 99-06, 1999, where an attorney received a fee from a trust 
company to which the attorney referred business). 
 177. Id. at 29. 
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Harrison was adamant that Lawyer was to do nothing and 
say nothing to his wife and children, contending that they 
only saw him as their gravy train.  The conflict was so 
severe that Lawyer almost sent wife and children to 
another personal injury lawyer for their claims and causes 
of action, if any, resulting from the accident. 
During that year, Lawyer at all times only dealt with 
Harrison, his client, on his claims.  But then the 
defendant truck company offered its liability insurance 
policy limits of three million dollars for Harrison’s claims 
only.  This came after the initial demand letter and a life 
plan was followed by numerous letters and a mediation 
conference had been held before suit was filed.  While 
three million dollars seemed large, one third would go to 
Lawyer, and one third would go to Medicare and 
Medicaid to pay back lien claims of almost one third.  
Over Lawyer’s advice otherwise, Harrison made the 
decision to accept the offer and get the lawyering over 
with. 
Lawyer goes to Harrison’s wife and children, trying to get 
them to persuade Harrison otherwise.  Harrison’s wife 
and children agreed with Lawyer, and made it clear to 
Lawyer that they intended to go after the truck company 
for additional damages beyond the policy limits, especially 
since it impacted their own claims negatively. 
The clarity of Rule 1.6 on confidentiality has been 
strengthened with recent model rule revisions.178  Facts of the case 
study clearly show Lawyer violating the rule.  No matter how much 
Lawyer believed that Harrison’s decision was wrong, it was not 
enough to allow Lawyer to talk to persons with whom Harrison 
specifically directed him not to talk, and certainly not to divulge 
confidential information. 
Although Lawyer’s ethical break seems clear, it never seems 
clear when lawyers are in the middle of such situations.  The 
pressure on lawyers to hold on to clients and to maximize their 
potential fees is significant.  However, regardless of the want of 
lawyers to make more,  violations bring necessary sanctions.  
Safeguarding confidentiality is one of the most important 
protections that lawyers give to their clients.179 
 
 178. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002). 
 179. Id. 
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While Rule 1.6 is easily read and usually followed,180 the 
difficulty comes most often when the lawyer has a relationship with 
family members of the client being served.  Tensions regarding 
confidentiality between spouses and their lawyer in a multiple 
representation have been examined in countless symposia, books, 
and articles.181  This particular situation is uncommon. However, 
similar situations commonly occur, often arising in the context of 
conventional estate planning and intergenerational 
communications. So important is this ethical protection that it even 
extends beyond death.182 
If the above case study is too simplistic and an obvious 
violation of Rule 1.6, then consider a twist in the facts where lawyer 
has hired SNT Specialist and SNT Specialist does not represent 
Harrison, but represents Lawyer.  SNT Specialist’s engagement is to 
 
 180. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 29. 
 181. See ABA Annotated Model Rules (4th ed. 1999), at 108 (citing In re 
Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d 1 (Mo 1992)); Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers As a 
Hedge against Guardianship: Should the Attorney-at-law Accept Appointment As 
Attorney-in-fact?, 2 ELDER L. J. 39 (1994).  See also (i) Russell G. Pearce, Forward, 
Symposium: Should the Family Be Represented as an Entity?: Reexamining the 
Family Values of Legal Ethics, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5, 6 and n.33 
(1998)(“in the context of bar organization deliberations, arguments for a 
communitarian construction of legal ethics codes has been offered . . . .Apparently 
as a result of lobbying by bar groups, the American Law Institute modified the 
Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers to permit lawyers greater flexibility in 
limiting their obligations to individual family members in joint 
representation….”); Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and Delegation: The 
Ethics of Marital Representation, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 106 (1998); Teresa 
Stanton Collett, Love Among the Ruins: The Ethics of Counseling Happily Married 
Couples, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 139 (1998); and Steven H. Hobbs and Fay Wilson 
Hobbs, The Ethical Management of Assets for Elder Clients: A Context, Role and Law 
Approach, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1411 (1994). 
 182.  See Pennell, supra note 86, at 34-35. See also, North Carolina RPC 206 
where the personal representative of a decedent sought to have decedent’s 
attorney disclose confidential information to the personal representative.  RPC 
206 indicates that the duty of confidentiality continues after death of a decedent 
and a lawyer may only reveal such confidential information of a deceased client if 
disclosure is permitted by an exception to the duty of confidentiality.  See also 
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding the attorney-client 
privilege continues after the death of a client).  In RPC 206, it was assumed that 
the client impliedly authorized the release of confidential information to the 
person designated as personal representative so the estate might be properly and 
thoroughly administered.  The RPC concludes that “unless the disclosure of 
confidential information to the personal representative . . .would be clearly 
contrary to the goals of the original representation or would be contrary to 
express instructions given by the client to his lawyer prior to the client’s death, the 
lawyer may reveal a client’s confidential information to the personal 
representative.” 
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provide to Lawyer the special needs trust, structured so that an 
NPA is the pooled trustee.  Wife and children are on the SNPT 
advisory committee, advising and instructing trustee on trust 
distributions.  They also are contingent beneficiaries of the SNPT 
beyond Harrison’s life.183  In this situation, SNT Specialist divulges 
information that lawyer shares with her about the settlement and 
about lawyer’s objection to Harrison settling on the policy limits.  
Does the result change when one is a step or two removed from the 
direct confidential relationship?  The answer is no.  Confidentiality 
has been violated and it does not matter from what source or by 
whom.184  Lawyer had a duty to make clear to SNT Specialist that 
Harrison had qualified communications, baring communcations 
between Lawyer and his wife and children.  This extended to SNT 
Specialist even if SNT Specialist was not told by Lawyer.  SNT 
Specialist should have more carefully discussed with Lawyer how 
SNT Specialist would accomplish her task without divulging 
confidential information, and with whom she could share 
Harrison’s confidences. 
b.  The Participants in Personal Injury Litigation185 
When sought to be involved in personal injury litigation, elder 
law and estate and trust lawyers answer the question “Who is my 
client?” correctly as long as they adhere to ethics rules invoking 
loyalty, duty and, confidences.186  The lawyer may agree to be the 
plaintiff’s lawyer, the plaintiff’s lawyer’s lawyer, the defendant’s 
lawyer, the defendant’s lawyer’s lawyer or even the defense 
insurance company’s lawyer. 
Once the client or clients who have the client-lawyer 
relationship are identified in a personal injury case, the intervening 
elder law or estate and trust lawyer must resolve whether he or she 
 
 183. The more restrictive application of d4c would require the total remaining 
corpus to remain in the NPA, or pay back Medicaid and then allow disbursement 
to contingent beneficiaries.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C); supra  note 33. 
 184. Id. 
 185. The author previously published portions of this part of the article in A. 
Frank Johns, Preserving Assets with Supplemental Needs Trusts, TRIAL, November 1998, 
at 90. 
 186. Cf. Pennell, supra note 86, at 20 (citing the late Fred Corneel, who 
suggests a reality check that asks two questions:  “(1) who does the attorney think 
is the client, and (2) who do the clients think is their attorney? If the role the 
attorney thinks (s)he is playing and the role the clients think he is playing differ, it 
is a pretty safe guess that a conflict exists”). 
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will be an attorney of record in the case.  This often requires 
appearing at hearings where distribution of the damage award or 
settlement is considered.187  In many cases, the SNT Specialist is not 
an attorney of record in the case; she or he only provides 
consultation and documents to the client or clients while not 
actually participating in the judicial process.188 
In the variations above relating to confidences,189 when the 
estate and trust practitioner or elder law attorney is engaged, there 
should be extensive documentation of the many conflicts and 
difficulties going on between Harrison and his family.  Once 
engaged, SNT Specialist should reply with his or her own written 
documentation of what he or she believes the hooks and difficulties 
are within the client matter and have the client confirm the 
accuracy of what SNT Specialist has documented.  If the client is 
the lawyer, then understanding what is being asked for should be 
clear.  If not, written request for confirmation of the client-lawyer 
relationship is a must.  However, when the client is the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff’s family, or others who do not understand the rules of 
legal ethics, then an even more lengthy explanation and 
confirmation of position should be documented before any work 
begins. 
c. The Bank or Trust Company as a Client 
Problematic to the focus of this article, special needs pooled 
trusts, is the choice of a trustee, because the trustee by definition 
must be an NPA.  No known banks or trust companies have within 
their corporate structures an NPA that serves as trustee of SNPTs. 
 
 187. This could be customized on a case by case basis.  However, the other 
attorneys involved will look to the Specialist to appear and field all questions 
raised by the court relating to the motions and pleadings before it. 
 188. It is this author’s opinion that consulting without court appearance is not 
the best practice, and may not be the best advocacy for the disabled plaintiff.  This 
is so in part because the best practice (and in some states the rule) is to give notice 
of the hearing on the motion for a court ordered trust to the government 
providers involved, or to be involved in covering costs of medical and health care 
needs and services of the disabled plaintiff benefiting from the resources diverted 
to the special needs trust.  Attorneys representing government providers have not 
only appeared on a regular basis at hearings as attorneys of record, but have 
generated significant (sometimes credible) opposition to the disabled plaintiff’s 
pursuit of the court’s order authorizing the creation of the trust, and the 
distribution of the award or settlement funds into it. 
 189. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(d)(4)(A)(B) and (C) (2002); supra text 
accompanying note 34. 
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However, this author has had recent contact with boutique trust 
companies whose focus is partnering with those involved in 
personal injury litigation and structure settlement consultants 
negotiating the annuities that are subsequently a significant 
component of the SNTs or SNPTs that are the end result.  The 
trust companies are also looking to partner with NPAs in the asset 
management of lump settlements, and the acquisition of structured 
annuities to be held in SNPTs.  This has presented situations where 
the bank or trust company has been integrally involved in 
negotiating the engagement of the SNPT legal Specialist, creating a 
strong inference that the bank or trust company is the client.  
These situations are similar to banks and trust companies working 
with elder law attorneys and estate and trust lawyers to promote the 
use of the bank or trust company’s revocable trust forms so that the 
customers and clients will usually choose the bank or trust company 
as trustee.190  
In some situations, the analogy is closer to arrangements that 
surface in marketing living trusts. In an article for the Fordham 
Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients,191 
Professor Pennell addressed problems involving various kinds of 
fiduciaries, raising the question of the lawyer’s response when the 
fiduciary, or administrator, engages in illegal or improper acts or 
conduct, particularly when it impacts a vulnerable elderly 
beneficiary.192  Pennell chronicled the confusion in authority that 
existed at the time while providing alternatives that may permit 
lawyers to make disclosures to beneficiaries.193  Since publication of 
the Fordham Ethics Conference On the Elderly in 1994, the 
revision to Model Rule 1.7 and its comments has attempted to 
address situations when there is a need to not only confirm in 
writing who the client is to the client, but to those who are not the 
client as well.194 
Consider the continuing case study of Harrison with the 
following variation: 
Lawyer had on several occasions in the past used 
CeteBank to provide lines of credit to fund the larger 
 
 190. See Pennell, supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who Is the 
Client?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (1994). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Model Rules of Prof. Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. 27-33 (2002); supra text 
accompanying note 140. 
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personal injury cases in his practice.  Harrison’s case was 
no different. CeteBank also provided Lawyer personally 
with securities and insurance services and products.  
When the time came for Lawyer to consider an SNPT for 
Harrison, he mentioned it to his CeteBank banker.  It just 
so happened that the bank was a huge multi-national 
institutional conglomerate.  Banker contacted his services 
and products division in Cete, Germany, finding out that 
not only did CeteBank have an SNPT, but it also had 
CareGivers, Inc., an NPA care-giving company on contract 
to CeteBank. CareGivers, Inc., would provide both the 
non-profit vehicle required by law, and the case 
management needed for Harrison.  CeteBank convinced 
Lawyer that its structured annuity, nonprofit association, 
and SNPT documents were “tried and true,” having been 
approved countless times in courts across the country. 
CeteBank explained to Lawyer that he should hire a 
Specialist to be his counsel, to provide the actual SNPT 
document and to confirm the propriety of CareGivers, 
Inc., as the NPA. Lawyer hired SNT Specialist to develop 
the SNPT and advise about CareGivers, Inc.  The written 
engagement contract made clear that SNT Specialist was 
only Lawyer’s lawyer.  SNT Specialist approved 
CareGivers, Inc., and sent Lawyer her proposed SNPT 
document. Lawyer sent it to CeteBank counsel in New 
York.  The SNPT document was returned to SNT 
Specialist and with edit expressly confirming that 
CeteBank would be the asset management and investment 
advisor of CareGivers, Inc., but would also use CeteBank 
subsidiaries to provide products and services for which it 
would pay fees and commissions as in its normal banking 
arrangements with other customers.  None of the 
additional fees and commissions would be considered a 
part of the fees that CeteBank or CareGivers, Inc. would 
be paid for trustee and banking services. 
SNT Specialist made clear to its client, Lawyer, that 
Lawyer could be exposed to future criticism for what was 
added to the SNPT and that Lawyer had a duty to make 
clear to his client what was in the SNPT and how it would 
impact on Harrison.  Lawyer countered that SNT 
Specialist was his lawyer and nothing was to be 
communicated to Harrison by SNT Specialist. 
After the SNPT was in place and fully funded, Lawyer took 
responsibility for the SNPT estate and fiduciary 
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administration.  Nothing was in writing, except for 
Lawyer’s form letter sent to Harrison declaring the client-
lawyer relationship in the personal injury case closed. 
(1) Conflict of Interest – Model Rule 1.7 – General Rule 
When working with SNPTs, applying the adversity component 
of Rule 1.7 is no less confusing than before the revisions.  This is 
especially true since the House of Delegates rejected the E2K 
Commission’s recommendation to require engagement letters in 
all client-lawyer relationships.  It instead required a written contract 
only in those situations where the material limitation and adversity 
are significant.195  In this case study variation, there are numerous 
points where clarity of relationship, as far as the client-lawyer 
representation is concerned, should have been confirmed in 
writing.196  Certainly, SNT Specialist should have had a document 
that mandated the limitations imposed by Lawyer.  When there is 
no oral or express written declaration of engagement that confirms 
who the client is, lawyers are at risk that what they have entered 
into does not comport with the conflicts rule.197  Additionally, they 
will find no real support in existing authority,198which is 
 
 195. See Model Rules, supra note 95 and accompanying text.  The ABA E2K 
Commission recommended revising Rule 1.5 by adding a requirement that a 
lawyer communicate fees, scope and expenses in writing.  The Summary Report 
from the ABA cryptically explained the vote by  the House of Delegates as follows: 
During the August 6-7, 2001 meeting of the American Bar Association 
House of Delegates in Chicago, the House considered the changes to 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct proposed by the Commission 
on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (“Ethics 2000”).  
The House voted on the Rules from the Preamble through Rule 1.10 
and approved all of the Commission’s recommendations with the 
following exceptions: 
Rule 1.5: approved an amendment to delete the requirement of a 
writing in Rule 1.5(b). 
 196. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 43.  Pennell contends that the only way to 
answer virtually all the questions is to put them in the engagement letter. If this is 
done, it avoids a spillover of ancillary duties.  Pennell suggests that this is the first, 
last and best advice on the topic.  Id. 
 197. Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Conflicts of Interest in Estate Planning for Husband 
and Wife, 20 THE PROBATE LAWYER 15, 23 (1994), cited in ACTEC Commentaries, 
supra note 110, at 177 (“There are basic principles of practice that apply when 
concurrent representation is undertaken in any such situation . . . .”).  See also 
ACTEC, Engagement Letters: A Guide for Practitioners, supra note 147. 
 198. See, e.g., Reports of the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility of 
the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association, 28 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 763 (1994). 
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inconsistent.199  The only source for what limited authority is 
available is found in Restatement (Third) of the Law, and even 
then it is hard to discern what constitutes a “likely 
misunderstanding.” 200 
In the last case study variation, where there is no writing, 
privity (not specifically ethics but contracts), nor the waiver of it, 
the attorney may be exposed to liability and the rights of non-
parties asserting any action against the attorney must be examined.  
This is done on a state-by-state basis because each state addresses 
privity or any statutory equivalent differently.201  When no 
relationship to the Lawyer is expressed in writing, then the “default 
rule” suggests that the only client of Lawyer is the fiduciary.202  
Here, the SNPT, Harrison, and the contingent beneficiaries of the 
SNPT are not actually clients within a client-lawyer relationship.203 
The scope of the lawyer’s fiduciary and ethical boundaries 
surrounding the client-lawyer relationship is expanding beyond the 
privity construct when specifically applied in trusts and estates and 
elder law practices.204  Concomitant with the expanding scope of 
the client-lawyer relationship is the inclusion of the lawyer’s 
fiduciary and ethical duties to those described as derivative clients, 
“almost clients” or non-clients.205  Nowhere will these expanding 
boundaries of lawyering in trusts and estates and elder law have any 
greater impact than in a trust situation as shown in the case study 
variation involving Harrison, an elderly plaintiff and his family.206 
 
 199. See Pennell, supra note 86, at 43. 
 200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW § 163 (declaring that if there will be 
likely misunderstanding without an engagement contract, then it is a requirement 
of the attorney to make clear to those who are not clients that they are not 
clients). 
 201. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See Pennell,  supra note 86, at 45. 
 204. Portions of this section were published by the author in FICKETT’S 
THICKET, supra note 102.  See, e.g., Comment, Arizona Appellate Decisions 1976-77, VI. 
Legal Profession, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 488, 653-671 (1977); Ronald C. Link et al., 
Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Planning Lawyer: The 
Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. (1987). 
 205. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 110, at 772 (identifying those who are 
beneficiaries in fiduciary relationships with lawyers as “almost clients”). 
 206. The accuracy of this assertion is shown in Mieras v. DeBona, 550 N.W.2d 
202 (Mich. 1996), where the American Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”), 
at the time numbering thirty-three million members and serving Americans age 
fifty and older, filed an amicus brief supporting judicial recognition of exceptions 
to the privity doctrine in the will drafting context.  AARP asserted that a majority 
of states had already eliminated the requirement of privity in the will-drafting 
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That Harrison, much less his family as contingent 
beneficiaries, would ever be considered within the scope of 
Lawyer’s duties is the result of pressure generated from many areas, 
including two that are quite visible: (1) within the legal profession, 
addressing the need for the legal profession to hold lawyers 
accountable for legal services, including those of a fiduciary nature, 
that harm or injure identifiable persons, or a limited class of 
persons, intended by the client to benefit from the lawyer’s work;207 
and, (2) within the state courts, addressing the lawyer’s duty of care 
beyond the lawyer’s privity relationship to those, other than the 
client, receiving benefit from the client-lawyer relationship.208 
In the context of this article older people like Harrison are 
growing in significant numbers. The expectations of this class of 
older Americans may be one reason why lawyers’ scope of duties is 
expanding.209  These older Americans are provided legal services 
that include a vast array of products and documents that serve third 
parties, and often address asset preservation options that transfer 
assets to achieve tax avoidance and governmental benefits.  The 
elderly expect their legatees, beneficiaries, and intended recipients 
to be properly served by the legal documents that their lawyers 
 
context based on public policy concerns and recognition that the rationales 
underlying the requirement are inapplicable.  See Mieras v. DeBona, AARP Amicus 
Brief, at 2-5.  In the AARP amicus brief, statement of interest, the AARP confirmed 
how important the issue was to older Americans: 
Older people place their trust and the well-being of themselves and 
their heirs in the hands of advisors, whether they are attorneys, 
accountants, bankers, or financial planners, with the expectation that 
these professionals possess the skills necessary to advise them and to 
implement the decisions they make in reliance on this advice.  
Attorneys who draft wills and who, due to their own negligence, fail to 
take the steps necessary to carry out their clients’ wishes are in a 
unique situation because their clients typically are dead by the time 
their mistakes are discovered.  Because neither the decedent nor his or 
her estate can seek relief, these attorneys should be held liable to the 
intended beneficiaries under the will, the only remaining parties truly 
injured by the attorney’s acts or omissions.  Allowing such liability is 
the only way to provide meaningful redress for the attorney’s now-
deceased client and to deter future negligence by the attorney.   
Mieras v. DeBona, AARP Amicus Brief, at 2. 
 207. See GREEN & COLEMAN, supra note 99, at 1001. 
 208. See Report of the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility, 
Counseling the Fiduciary, 28 REAL PROP. PROB.  & TR J. 825 (1994).  See also Ross, 
supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 209. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(d)(4)(A)(B) and (C) (2002); supra text and 
analysis accompanying note 189. 
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create.210 
Additionally, the preparation must include the incorporation 
into the lawyer’s habit of practice the choice of a client model, 
identifying when it is appropriate to confirm the individual, 
multiple, unit, or entity as the client.211  Once the model is chosen, 
and the client identified, lawyers should reduce client engagements 
to writing, explain the content, and have clients sign an 
acceptance.  As a part of the engagement document, lawyers also 
should make it a habit of practice to understand how they may or 
may not limit liability for delivery of services, or at least make 
certain disclosures that the scope of their representation does not 
include derivative clients, almost clients or non-clients.212 
There are strong opposing positions on whether expansion of 
lawyer fiduciary and ethical duties should eliminate the doctrine of 
privity.213  The position opposing expansion asserts the general 
argument that maintaining the doctrine of privity and barring 
recovery by third parties is grounded in two perspectives: one that 
the client creating the engagement should not lose control over 
the lawyer and how the agreement is implemented, and the other 
that contracting parties should not have imposed on them an 
expanded burden or liability to the general public.214 
The position promoting expansion asserts the general 
argument that eliminating the doctrine of privity and justifying 
recovery by third parties is grounded in theories that include 
negligence in tort,215 breach of contract relating to third party 
beneficiaries,216 and a “hybrid” or multi-criteria combining contract 
and tort.217 
 
 210. See FICKETT’S THICKET, supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 211. See ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110, at 50-59. 
 212. See Engagement Letters:  A Guide for Practitioners, supra note 147, at 9, 19. 
 213. See  Christopher H. Gadsden, Ethical Duties of Estate Planners–What Would 
You Do?–Keeping Client Confidence, PROB. & PROP., 18 (Sept./Oct. 1995). 
 214. See Joan Teshima, Annotation, What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to 
Render Attorney Liable to Person Other than Immediate Client, 61 A.L.R. 4th 464, 473-
475 (1988); Joan Teshima, Annotation, Attorney’s Liability to one Other than Immediate 
Client for Negligence in Connection with Legal Duties, 61 A.L.R. 4th 615, 625, 639 
(1988); Patrick Emery Longan, Middle-Class Lawyering in the Age of Alzheimer’s:  The 
Lawyer’s Duties in Representing a Fiduciary, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 901 (2001). 
 215. See Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969). 
 216. See Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81 (Conn. 1981). 
 217. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
987 (1962).  Examples of the opposing views were highlighted in case studies by 
Lawrence Fox and Christopher Gadsden in a recent issue of Probate and Property, 
the magazine of the Real Property Probate and Trust Section of the American Bar 
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The ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.2 asserts the general 
principle that the lawyer and client are “relatively free to define the 
scope and objectives of representation, including the extent to which 
information will be shared among multiple clients and the nature 
and extent of the obligations that the lawyer will have to the client.”218  
As far as multiple clients are concerned, the commentary describes 
the lawyer’s responsibility to discuss with the client the functions of a 
personal representative, trustee or other fiduciary,219 making it clear 
that the lawyer should discuss with the client or clients the lawyer’s 
role in representing fiduciaries in administrative functions, including 
the possibility that the lawyer may owe duties to the beneficiaries with 
the resulting benefit in better equipping clients to select and give 
directions to fiduciaries.220 
As part of the general rule, the commentary states that 
beneficiaries should be told by the lawyer that the fiduciary has 
engaged a lawyer and that the fiduciary is the client, explaining 
further that while at times beneficiaries will receive information 
regarding the fiduciary estate, the lawyer does not represent them, 
and the beneficiaries should consider retaining independent counsel 
to represent their interests.221 
The commentary goes on to explain that when a lawyer 
represents a fiduciary of an estate, there should be no attempt to 
diminish or eliminate by agreement with the fiduciary the duties the 
lawyer may otherwise owe to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate 
without first giving them notice.222 
The commentary acknowledges that many circumstances may 
 
Association.  See Gadsden, supra note 213; Lawrence J. Fox, Ethical Duties of Estate 
Planners--What Would You Do?--Liability Squared, PROB. & PROP., 19 (Sept./Oct. 
1995). 
 218. See ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110, at 50. 
 219. Id. at 51. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 51-52. 
 222. See ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110, at 56-57 (the commentaries 
give an example that 
without first giving notice to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate, a 
lawyer should not agree with a fiduciary not to disclose to the 
beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate any acts or omissions on the part of 
fiduciary that the lawyer would otherwise be permitted or required to 
disclose to the beneficiaries.  In jurisdictions that permit the lawyer for 
a fiduciary to make such disclosures, [a] lawyer generally should not 
give up the opportunity to make such disclosures where the lawyer 
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vary the nature and extent of the lawyer’s duties to the beneficiaries 
of the fiduciary estate.223  Although largely restrictive in nature, it is 
noteworthy that the commentary declares that the lawyer for the 
fiduciary owes some duties to non-client beneficiaries,224 and at times, 
protection of the interests of the beneficiaries may require the 
affirmative action of the lawyer.  The commentary makes reference to 
the characterization of beneficiaries as derivative or secondary clients 
of the lawyer for the fiduciary,225 providing another example relating 
to duties to beneficiaries: 
[A] lawyer who is retained by a fiduciary individually may 
owe few, if any, duties to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary 
estate other than ones the lawyer owes to other third 
parties.  Thus, a lawyer who is retained by a fiduciary to 
advise the fiduciary regarding the fiduciary’s defense to an 
action brought against the fiduciary by a beneficiary may 
have no duties to the beneficiaries beyond those due to 
other adverse parties or nonclients.226 
On the premise that estate planning and estate administration 
are fundamentally nonadversarial in nature, the commentary on 
Model Rule 1.7 asserts that when estate planning goals of multiple 
clients are not entirely consistent, it does not necessarily preclude the 
lawyer from representing them.227  This conclusion is rationalized by 
the fact that “[a]dvising related clients who have somewhat different 
goals may be consistent with their interests and the lawyer’s 
traditional role as a lawyer for the ‘family,’” and may prove to be the 
most cost effective representation in achieving the objectives.228 
Multiple client representation regarding related matters often 
involves impermissible conflicts, including ones that affect the 
interest of third parties, or even the lawyer’s own interests.  While 
keeping this in mind, a lawyer who continues with a representation 
that involves tolerable conflicts at the outset may have to respond to 
changing conditions that make the conflicts intolerable by ending the 
client-lawyer relationship subject to Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2, which 
address conflict of interest and intermediary representation, 
 
 223. Id. at 57. 
 224. Id.; see also ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110, at 60-77, (providing case 
citations from every state and the District of Columbia omitted). 
 225. Supra note 110, at 57. 
 226. Id. at 57-58. 
 227. Id. at 154. 
 228. Id. at 150. 
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respectively.229  The commentary gives two additional examples 
related to estate planning which are used later in this article as the 
basis for more descriptive case studies.230 
Biakanja v. Irving,231 was the first case to make a dent in the 
doctrine of privity.  Since then, the doctrine of privity has been 
 
 229. Id. at 153-54.  The commentary notes that in some states certain services 
require independent representation or otherwise may be invalidated.  On the 
other hand, the commentary notes that if “necessary preconditions are met, a 
lawyer may, with informed consent of the parties, represent both parties to a 
transaction, such as the formation of a business enterprise, the execution of an 
employment agreement or a buy-sell agreement, or a joint spousal election to split 
gifts.”  Id.  Note that Rule 2.2 has been repealed with its substance incorporated in 
to Comments to Rule 1.7. 
 230. Id. at 153.  Example 1.7-2 illustrates: 
Lawyer (L) represents Trustee (T) as trustee of a trust created by X.  L 
may properly represent T in connection with other matters that do not 
involve a conflict of interest, such as the preparation of a will or other 
personal matters not related to the trust.  L should not  charge the 
trust for any personal services that are performed for T.  Moreover, in 
order to avoid misunderstandings, L should charge T for any 
substantial personal services that L performs for T.   
Id.  See also, Example 1.7-3: 
Lawyer (L) represented Husband (H) and Wife (W) jointly with 
respect to estate planning matters.  H died leaving a will that appointed 
Bank (B) as executor and as trustee of a trust for the benefit of W that 
meets the QTIP requirements under I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7).  L has agreed 
to represent B and knows that W looks to him as her lawyer.  L may 
represent both B and W if the requirements of MRPC 1.7 are met.  If a 
serious conflict arises between B and W, L may be required to withdraw 
as counsel for B or W or both.  L may inform W of her elective share, 
support, homestead or other rights under the local law without 
violating MRPC 1.9 (Conflict of Interest: Former Client).  However, 
without the informed consent of all affected parties L should not 
represent W in connection with an attempt to set aside H’s will or to 
assert an elective share.   
Id. 
 231. 320 P.2d 16, 18-19 (Cal. 1958).  Biakanja is considered the leading case 
that rejected the privity requirement, allowing the intended beneficiary to 
recovery against the defendant notary public who incorrectly attested a will that 
was denied probate; see also Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961), cert. 
den. 386 U.S. 987: 
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be 
held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and 
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent 
to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the 
forseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the 
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, . . . and the policy of 
preventing future harm.   
Id. at 650. 
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thoroughly examined in many state jurisdictions.232 
A majority of the jurisdictions that have addressed the privity 
doctrine in the context of trusts and estates have not adhered to it 
when examining third party, non-client malpractice, or liability 
against lawyers.233  However, the demise of the doctrine of privity is 
far from complete.234  While possibly moving from the doctrine of 
privity in the future, there are still many appellate court decisions 
that recognize it, even in the trusts and estates context.235  The 
 
 232. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, 154–66, 242-96 (West 
Pub. Co. 1986). 
 233. See Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577-578 (Tex. 1996), citing Lucas v. 
Hamm,  364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987(1962); Stowe v. 
Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 83 (Conn. 1981); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 
(D.C. 1983); DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Ogle 
v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224, 226-27 (Ill. 1984); Walker v. Lawson, 526 N.E.2d 968, 
968 (Ind. 1988); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Pizel v. 
Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 51 (Kan. 1990); In re Killingsworth, 292 So.2d 536, 542 (La. 
1973); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292-93 (Or. 1987); Guy v. Liederbach, 459 
A.2d 744, 751-53 (Pa. 1983); Auric v. Continental Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 327 
(Wis. 1983).  But see Lilyhorn v. Dier, 335 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Neb. 1983); Viscardi v. 
Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662, 663-64 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1986); Simon v. 
Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987)  (The court further explained that 
although several states allowed intended beneficiaries a broad cause of action, 
citing Stowe, 441 A.2d at 84; Ogle, 80 Ill.Dec. at 775, 466 N.E.2d at 227; and Hale, 
744 P.2d at 1293, it cited other state courts limiting the class of plaintiffs to 
beneficiaries specifically identified in an invalid will or trust, citing Ventura 
County Humane Society v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 903-04 (1974); DeMaris, 
426 So.2d at 1154; Schreiner, 410 N.W.2d at 683 (The court identified this case as 
an example of when “a cause of action ordinarily will arise only when as a direct 
result of the lawyer’s professional negligence the testator’s intent as expressed in 
the testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in part and the beneficiary’s 
interest in the estate is either lost, diminished, or unrealized”); Kirgan v. Parks, 
478 A.2d 713, 718-19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)(holding that, if cause of action 
exists, it does not extend to situation where testator’s intent as expressed in the 
will has been carried out); Ginther v. Zimmerman, 491 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1992); Guy, 459 A.2d at 751-52. 
 234. See Bruce S. Ross, Legal Malpractice and Estate Planning and Administration, 
18 ACTEC Notes 240-248, 250-51 (1992)(acknowledging that the “dragon of 
‘privity,’ applied to bar a malpractice claim for the alleged negligent drafting of a 
testamentary instrument, has not been slain, although the cases are short on 
discussion of the theoretical justification for the continued application of the 
doctrine”). 
 235. See Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 580 n.1 (dissenting opinion of Cornyn, 
identifying courts that still adhere to the privity doctrine, citing Williams v. Bryan, 
Cave, McPheeters and McRoberts, 774 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); St. 
Mary’s Church v. Tomek, 325 N.W.2d 164, 165 (1982); Viscardi v. Lerner, 510 
N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (1986); Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987).  
In addition to the above referenced states of Missouri, Nebraska, New York and 
Ohio, the states of Washington, Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d  1080 (Wash. 1994), 
Texas, Barcelo., 923 S.W.2d at 575, and Illinois, Rutkowski v. Hollis, 600 N.E.2d 
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Texas Supreme Court decision, Barcelo v. Elliott,236 is an example of 
the retreat to the bright-line privity rule, denying a cause of action 
to beneficiaries of a trust whom the attorney for the settlor did not 
represent.  However, the Michigan Supreme Court decision, Mieras 
v. DeBona,237 is an example of the rejection of the doctrine of privity 
relating to beneficiaries of a will whom the drafting attorney never 
represented. 
(2) Failure to Exercise Independent Judgment 
In the Harrison variation, the state’s case law and ethics 
opinions will weigh greatly on Lawyer’s exposure to liability coming 
from losses and exorbitant fees and commissions assessed not by 
Lawyer, but by CeteBank and the NPA, CareGivers, Inc.  One final 
point, if Lawyer and SNT Specialist have not fully explained to 
Harrison’s wife and children why any remainder corpus in the 
SNPT beyond Harrison’s life goes to the NPA, CareGivers, Inc., 
then they may be exposed to liability if the family prevails in causes 
of action as derivative clients. 
d.  The NPA or Consumer Disability Advocacy Group as 
Client 
While the NPA is defined by federal and state law and the trust 
document as trustee, it usually is not.  Most of the time, the NPA 
will be involved because of its disabled members or customers and 
its mission and goals of individual advocacy for the elderly.238  As 
discussed earlier in the article, a mandatory element of the SNPT 
comes from the way in which federal and state laws have defined 
who the trustee must be.239  The trustee must be a nonprofit 
association (NPA) serving the advocacy, case management, and 
care giving needs of the trust beneficiary.  In the ordinary course of 
trust and estate development and administration, the institutional, 
financial or corporate trustee is the norm.  Institutional trustees 
function within the institutional banking and trust environment, 
analytically focused on the corpus of the SNPT.  These institutional 
trustees invest and manage assets, and administer the receipts and 
 
1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) are identified as states supporting the privity doctrine in 
the trusts and estates context. 
 236. Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 575. 
 237. 550 N.W.2d at 202. 
 238. See supra note 46. 
 239. See supra note 33. 
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disbursements of the trust through periodic accountings mandated 
during the life of the SNPT. 
The NPA trustee is a much stranger duck.  The more that it is 
utilized, the stranger it seems to get.240  Often, the NPA has no 
institutional banking, trust or fiduciary alignment.  However, it 
needs constant assistance from some financial source to handle the 
managed funds under trust and properly account for receipts and 
disbursements.241  Additionally, NPAs being sought to carry trust 
responsibilities of SNPTs seek legal assistance from lawyers to 
provide them, as NPA trustees, with legal counsel for trust 
administration, distribution of funds, and attending to the 
complexities of benefits eligibility, especially when the benefits are 
means-tested like that of Medicaid or SSI.242 
(1) Conflict of Interest–Model Rule 1.7–General Rule 
Using the same criteria and analysis as in earlier commentary 
on other relationships, several factual variations are briefly 
examined for the readers to carefully consider. 
There are times when the SNT Specialist is the same person 
that has been hired by Lawyer to provide SNT documents and assist 
in moving the NPA into position to serve the interests of someone 
like Harrison.  There is a potential for SNT Specialist to have her 
loyalties diluted between the NPA that she has assisted and worked 
with for decades, and Harrison.  Of course, if SNT Specialist has 
expressly declared her client-lawyer relationship with Lawyer, then 
there is no direct relationship with Harrison.  However, Lawyer is 
clearly Harrison’s attorney, and if he is at all aware of the tangled 
relationship between SNT Specialist, the NPA, and Harrison, then 
what is his duty?  Does he have a duty to do anything about SNT 
Specialist’s divided loyalties?  The current answer, based on the 
qualified assumptions above, is no. Lawyer does not have a duty to 
do anything about SNT Specialist’s connection to the NPA because 
there has yet to be anything shown or asserted that would be 
 
 240. This is the author’s opinion based on the only available information on 
those visible NPAs that are either created by groups advocating the interests of 
their members, see supra note 46, or religious groups attempting to serve 
parishioners and “the least of these our bretheren.”  Matthew 25:40. 
 241. See supra note 46, and accompanying text and analysis. NPAs do not have 
the financial experience to properly account for the investment of assets under 
management in the pooled umbrella construct that is mandataed by the law; see 
also supra note 33. 
 242. See supra note 46; supra note 33. 
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considered sufficient adversity to trigger notice, disclosure, and 
written waiver.243 
(2) Failure to Exercise Independent Judgment 
Again, using the same criteria and analysis as in earlier 
commentary on other relationships, the factual variation discussed 
in relation to independent judgment is examined within the 
context of independent judgment for the readers to carefully 
consider. 
As in an earlier variation, assume that in her practice, SNT 
Specialist has had her firm habitually maintain the administration 
of SNTs and SNPTs.  In Harrison’s case, SNT Specialist’s firm 
provides legal counseling to the NPA, Caregivers, Inc., and assists 
the institutional entity (CeteBank) with standard trust 
administrative services for both, all at a time when Harrison is no 
longer her client, if he ever was. 
It should be obvious that SNT Specialist’s loyalties might be 
divided between CeteBank and CareGivers.  SNT Specialist must 
weigh potential adversity in determining whether or not CeteBank 
and CareGivers need to be given notice, to be provided full 
disclosure, and to be asked to sign acknowledgement of waivable 
conflicts.244  It may not be so clear that SNT Specialist must also pay 
attention to Rule 1.9, addressing the protections of her prior client, 
Harrison.245  If SNT Specialist has complied with Rule 1.9, having 
Harrison sign a written waiver, if allowed,246 then what happens if 
something goes  awry that damages Harrison?  Where do the fees 
come from  that pay for correcting the problem created by SNT 
Specialist, CeteBank or CareGivers?  Does SNT Specialist expect to 
be paid for working out the damages that have befallen Harrison 
when the damages may have been SNT Specialist’s fault?247 
For example, assume a variation in the facts where CeteBank 
used SNPT assets under management to purchase an annuity 
product of “Life Long Benefits”, a subsidiary. Life Long Benefits 
presented an invoice to CareGivers for payment of the annuity. 
Caregivers sent the invoice to Cetebank.  CeteBank verified and 
 
 243. See supra note 140  and accompanying text. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See 2002 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 96, at 44-46, 
Comments 8-9; see ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 110, at 201-203. 
 246. Id. 
 247. See generally Pennell, supra note 86. 
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paid the invoice.  In addition to the invoice on the front end of the 
annuity, Life Long Benefits confirmed in writing to Caregivers, with 
a copy to SNT Specialist, that the rate of return on the annuity was 
variable; that it would be charging standard periodic administrative 
fees throughout the term of the annuity; and the annuity was life 
with no guaranteed period of payout certainty.  Unknown to SNT 
Specialist, Life Long Benefits invested most of its managed funds in 
technology and energy stocks. Before the year was over, the annuity 
was worthless.  That was about the time that certain accounting 
adjustments were made by CeteBank, and subsequently sent to SNT 
Specialist in the periodic statement and accounting of the corpus 
of the SNPT.  However, SNT Specialist was off in the next big 
personal injury case where she was to develop another SNPT.  She 
was not looking at what was being sent to here to be placed in the 
Harrison file, and neither was her staff, simply sticking the 
accounting in the file. 
CeteBank Banker took the executive director of CareGivers 
and a SNT Specialist to lunch shortly after the filing of the 
accounting, explaining that reversals in the economy and the 
significant downturn in the markets would reflect badly on the 
corpus of the SNPT.  He suggested, however, that it was going on 
everywhere and was unavoidable.  In the same breath, CeteBank 
Banker begins discussing a marketing plan to help “get the word 
out” about the virtues of Caregivers as an NPA and the benefits of 
SNPTs.  He explains that CeteBank is offering a very attractive 
equity line to fund the marketing campaign, to be used when 
necessary for Caregivers and SNT Specialist to cover expenses and 
salaries. 
(3) Violation of Client Confidences 
Again, using the same criteria and analysis as in earlier 
commentary on other relationships, the factual variation discussed 
in relation to client confidences is examined within the context of 
client confidences for the readers to carefully consider. 
As in an earlier variation, assume that in her practice, SNT 
Specialist has had her firm habitually maintain the administration 
of SNTs and SNPTs.  In Harrison’s case, SNT Specialist’s firm 
provides legal counseling to the NPA, Caregivers, Inc., and assists 
the institutional entity (CeteBank) with standard trust 
administrative services for both, all at a time when Harrison is no 
longer her client, if he ever was. 
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In this variation, CeteBank Banker has been having 
conversations with SNT Specialist, banker explains that Life Long 
Benefits will be going out of business and CeteBank will not be 
covering the failure of annuities such as the one in the Harrison 
SNPT.  This will completely gut the corpus of Harrison’s SNPT and 
he will have no supplemental support.  Further, Caregivers will 
receive no fees or have any corpus at the end of the SNPT from 
which to benefit.  To make matters worse, in an attempt to reduce 
its deficit, the State has begun to file claims against SNPTs for 
Medicaid Estate Recovery or for Medicaid Payback. Harrison calls 
SNT Specialist’s paralegal, demanding to know what happened to 
his million-dollar trust fund.  The paralegal had worked with 
Harrison during the year that the SNPT was under administration. 
He blurts out the whole story. Harrison  meets with SNT Specialist.  
She confirms what the paralegal told Harrison, but points the 
finger at Caregivers and CeteBank.  She also explains that she was 
not Harrison’s attorney when the SNPT was negotiated, she was 
Lawyer’s attorney and he should take it up with Lawyer. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article examined the self-settled special needs pooled 
trust, a relatively new option available to elder law attorneys, estate 
and trust lawyers, and other legal practitioners serving disabled or 
injured elderly clients.  It first gave a brief summary of  the 
discretionary support trust, and how the special needs pooled trust 
evolved.  The brief history was followed by a summary of the 
components of the d4C special needs pooled trust (SNPT), with a 
summary analysis of how to operate the trust in compliance with 
Medicaid eligibility.  The article then examined revisions to the 
Model Rules of Professional responsibility, applying several of them 
to various initial client-lawyer engagements where the trust 
Specialist is being engaged to design, implement, and fund an 
SNPT, raising questions of lawyer loyalty and conflict of interest, 
confidentiality and privity running running to the trustee, the 
beneficiary or both. 
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